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RADICALISM IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY: A RETROSPECTIVE
VIEW OF CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES AND RADICAL
CRIMINOLOGY
ALBERT P. CARDARELLI* & STEPHEN C. HICKS**
I. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AS A PRELUDE
As the end of the century approaches, there is a growing senti-
ment that we may be witnessing the end of the "Left" as a major
ideological force in American society.' The reasons for the pur-
ported demise, especially in American politics, are not always in
agreement, even among leftist scholars themselves. 2 One explana-
tion posits that the fall from power began with the ascendancy of the
"Right" in national politics with the election of Ronald Reagan, and
was accelerated by the collapse of communist governments through-
* Senior Fellow, John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Mas-
sachusetts, Boston. Ph.D., Sociology, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Suffolk Univer-
sity Law School.
** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. M.A., LL.B., Downing College,
Cambridge England; LL.M., University of Virginia.
I See generally JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN LEFT (1992);
JEFFREY GOLDFARB, THE CYNICAL SOCIETY: THE CULTURE OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICS
OF CULTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 82-102 (1992); Maurice Isserman & Michael Kazin, The
Failure and Success of the New Radicalism, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEL ORDER,
1930-1980, at 212 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS (1991); WINI BREINES, COMMUNITY
AND ORGANIZATION IN THE NEW LEFT, 1962-1968: THE GREAT REFUSAL (1989). For a
retrospective analysis of the New Left from a former member of the movement, see
generally BREINES, supra.
2 See Carolyn J. Mooney, Down but not Out, Socialist Scholars Gather to Redefine Political
and Academic Assumptions in Post-Soviet Era, 38 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 6, 1992, at
A19; Michael Ansara & S.M. Miller, Opening Up Progressive Thought, SOC. POL'Y, Summer
1986, at 3-10 (analyzing the challenges facing the left in American society).
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out Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.3 Whether this explana-
tion is adequate remains open to debate.4 There is, however, ready
acknowledgment that important political and cultural shifts con-
tinue, and that these shifts need to be examined within the historical
context of cultural change as it relates to the dominant ideas and
beliefs around which political philosophies cohere.5 In this vein,
Christopher Lasch early argued that modern radicalism can best be
understood as a phase of the social history of intellectuals whose
prime function is to be critics of society.6 From this perspective, the
content of radicalism will always be contingent upon the historical
circumstances of the period in which it arises; its intensity likely to
wax and wane over time; and its meaning likely to differ at the time
of its ascendancy from its historical closure or demise. This prem-
ise-that radicalism is itself historical both in terms of its meaning
and its political locus-is the theme upon which the present analysis
is structured, and from which we draw our conclusions. 7 To explore
this premise, our analysis focuses on two self-proclaimed radical al-
ternatives to established schools of thought in Law and Criminol-
ogy. These movements, "Radical Criminology" and "Critical
3 Mooney, supra note 2, at A19; BREINES, supra note 1, at 150-52.
4 See GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 103-17.
5 See LASCH, supra note 1, at 21.
6 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA: 1889-1963: THE INTEL-
LECTrUAL AS A SOCIAL TYPE ix (1965). For an analysis of radicalism and the role of the
intellectual, see Seymour Martin Lipset & Richard B. Dobson, The Intellectual as Critic and
Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union, DAEDALUS, Summer
1972, at 137; IRVING L. HoRowrrz, RADICALISM AND THE REVOLT AGAINST REASON: THE
SOCIAL THEORIES OF GEORGE SOREL (1968); and RICHARD H. PELLS, RADICAL VISIONS
AND THE AMERICAN DREAMS: CULTURE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS
151-93 (1973).
7 Radicalism can, of course, be associated with ideological movements on both the
"left" and the "right" of the political and cultural spectrum. For example, WILLIAM B.
HIXSON, JR., SEARCH FOR THE AMERICAN RIGHT WING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE RECORD, 1955-1987 (1992), synthesizes scholarly research on the contemporary
American right wing. For a recent and powerful analysis of the American Revolution as
a radical event, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992).
8 Over the last few decades, Radical Criminology has been variously referred to as
"Marxist Criminology," "Conflict Criminology" and "Critical Criminology," creating
confusion among both sympathizers and critics of Radical Criminology. Radical crimi-
nologists readily acknowledge an explicit debt to Marx and the critical theories of the
Frankfurt School. See, e.g., ThomasJ. Bernard, The Distinction Between Conflict and Radical
Criminology, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 362 (1981); W. Byron Groves & Robert J.
Sampson, Critical Theory and Criminology, 33 Soc. PROBs. 258 (1986); Stuart Henry & Dra-
gan Milovanovic, Constitutive Criminology: The Maturation of Critical Theory, 29 CRIMINOL-
OGY 293 (1991); Jim Thomas & Aogan O'Maolchata, Reassessing the Critical Metaphor: An
Optimistic Revisionist View, 6 JUST. Q. 143 (1989). In 1990, Critical Criminology, repre-
senting a more "leftist" oriented perspective, became a subsection of the American Sod-
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Legal Studies" (CLS), 9 rose to ascendancy during the 1960s and
1970s; each raised major intellectual challenges to the accepted
bodies of knowledge in their respective disciplines.
A. RADICAL MOVEMENTS AS HISTORICAL EVENTS
This article is not intended to develop a detailed history and
critique of Radical Criminology and CLS; such analyses have already
been established.10 Rather than focus on the details or agendas of
each movement, we shall focus on them as movements in the con-
text of the last thirty years-a period of history that now seems fate-
ful for the Left generally, while calling into question its continued
viability in the future.11 Thus, our analysis is a description and com-
mentary on a stage in the recent history of ideas, particularly radical
ideas within law and criminology, both of which were especially vul-
nerable to ideological controversy.1 2
Further, our analysis suggests that the stage we are seeking to
delimit and account for, both internally as a period of radical mo-
ment, and externally as a period of conservative political reaction, is
giving way as new forces and ideas appear on the horizon.13 Just as
CLS, in particular, made the argument that it is the awareness of
historical contingency that undermines the automatic acceptance of
the status quo, so too must that insight now be applied to both
movements. 14 Their power and critical acclaim are equally not im-
mutable. As feminists, environmentalists, minorities and fundamen-
ety of Criminology, and itself represents the historical maturation of radical/critical
criminology.
9 See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE LJ. 1515
(1991), for an overview of the development of CLS by a major figure in the movement.
10 For an overview of Radical Criminology, see MICHAEL J. LYNCH & W. BYRON
GROVES, A PRIMER IN RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY (1986); RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: THE COM-
ING CRISIS (James A. Inciardi ed., 1980); Robert M. Bohm, Radical Criminology: An Expli-
cation, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 565 (1982). For a general understanding of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, see ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(19 8 6 );J. Stuart Russell, The Critical Legal Studies Challenge to Contemporary Mainstream Legal
Philosophy, 18 OrrOWA L. REV. 1 (1986); David M. Trubek, Where the Action is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984). See generally CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987); ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction
to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986); Tushnet, supra note 9, at
1515.
11 See GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 82-102; DIGGINS, supra note 1, at 342-83.
12 See LASCH, supra note 6, at ix; DIGGINS, supra note 1, at 39-44.
13 See GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 170. See generally ALBERT BORGMANN, CROSSING THE
POSTMODERN DIVIDE (1992); DAVID GROSS, THE PAST IN RUINS: TRADITION AND THE CRI-
TIQUE OF MODERNITY (1992).
14 See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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talists seek to control the cultural agenda, one must ask where
Radical Criminology and CLS lie in the landscape of the Left to-
day. 15 Therefore, in examining these movements, the aim of this
analysis is not so much to ask what each stood for, nor what each
achieved, but what has changed in the last thirty years that affects
radical movements generally as agents of change and consciousness
raising. This, we believe, will inform our understanding of the pres-
ent and future possibilities for continued change within the
Academy.
It is necessary, of course, to both identify and compare Radical
Criminology and CLS in terms of their origins, challenges, strate-
gies and the intellectual, professional and social reactions each re-
ceived.' 6 As we will note in more detail, Radical Criminology is
generally more directly derived from Marxist analysis, while CLS is
much more a product of Legal Realism and the Frankfurt school of
critical theory. More important than their similarities and differ-
ences or even cross-fertilizations, however, is their overall role as
bearers of a radical tradition in what may be known as the "Left,"
especially with regard to the Academy and politics. The present ar-
ticle shall consider their critiques of liberalism, value-free social sci-
ence and academic neutrality, as well as their contributions to
theory, methodology and praxis. But we see both as ends in them-
selves, apart from their content-as ideologies destabilizing a partic-
ular historical stage, as programs that sustained a membership and
engendered creative intellectual energy. The major focus of the
present article is, therefore, upon radical movements within the
Academy as exemplified by the historical development of Radical
Criminology and CLS. However, as both movements are part of the
social history of intellectuals, some understanding of the period
from which they emerged and flourished is essential to our
discussion.' 7
15 See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
16 We shall only consider in passing why CLS never developed a radical criminal law
critique, and why Radical Criminology appears to have had little, if any, influence on
legal education. It is interesting to note that the revised edition of THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982) excluded two chapters on Radi-
cal Criminology that were part of the original edition published in 1990.
17 For an analysis of the 1960s from the perspective of those with direct experience
in the "New Left" movement, see generally DAVID CAUTE, THE YEAR OF THE BARRICADES:
AJOURNEY THROUGH 1968 (1988); TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF
RAGE (1987);JAMES MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS (1987). For more conserva-
tive interpretations, see CYRIL LEVITT, CHILDREN OF PRIVILEGE: STUDENT REVOLT IN THE
SIXTIES (1984) and GUENTER LEWY, PEACE AND REVOLUTION: THE MORAL CRISIS OF
AMERICAN PACIFICISM (1988). See also Margaret M. Braungart & Richard G. Braungart,
The Effects of the 1960s Political Generation on Former Left- and Right-Wing Youth Activist Lead-
1993] 505
CARDARELLI & HICKS
B. THE 1960s: A DECADE OF PROTEST
It is common knowledge that the decade of the 1960s was a
time when protest and dissent overshadowed the American land-
scape. Although the turbulence of the decade was both unantici-
pated and long-lasting, much of the momentum for the Civil Rights
and Anti-War movements, and student protests derived in large part
from events taking place during the 1950s, an era generally viewed
as one largely complacent and politically quiescent.1 8 Thus, Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka,19 the Supreme Court decision which
declared the policy of separate but equal schools invalid, was a mo-
mentous occasion that raised the civil rights movement of Black
Americans to a level of legitimacy previously denied in American
culture. Among students, the seeds for protest were already evident
in the emergence of the Student Peace Movement in the 1950s and
the establishment of progressive student organizations on several
prestigious campuses. 20 The complacency and conformity associ-
ated with this period are no doubt due in large part to the general
absence of public dissent coupled with the active repression of intel-
lectuals, artists and leftists.2 1 McCarthyism, at its height during the
early 1950s, attempted to place intellectuals in the negative image of
being "un-American," and by all accounts was successful in silenc-
ing academic radicals.22
As America entered the 1960s with the election of a President
who promised to move the country forward, the Civil Rights Move-
ment led not only to the widespread militancy within the black com-
munity, but also to the creation of a coalition of students, militants,
ers, 38 Soc. Probs. 297, 297-315 (1991), for an analysis of the lasting generational effects
on those who were part of the 1960s political generation.
18 See generally PAUL A. CARTER, ANOTHER PART OF THE FIFTIES (1983); ERIC F.
GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE-AND AFTER: AMERICA 1945-1960 (1960); RICHARD H.
PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE (1985); WILLIAM WHYrE, THE ORGAN-
IZATION MAN (1956). For an overview of the radical right during the 1950s, see generally
THE RADICAL RIGHr (Daniel Bell ed., 1963).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 Charles Perrow, The Sixties Observed, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RE-
SOURCE MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL CONTROL AND TACTICS 192, 203 (Mayer Zald &John Mc-
Carthy eds., 1988). See Special Issue, Students Protest 395 ANNALS 1-14 (1971), for a
review of student protests in the United States and elsewhere. For a discussion of the
impact of the civil rights movement on students associated with the Students for a Dem-
ocratic Society, see KIRPATRICK SALE, SDS (1973).
21 But see ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVER-
SITIES (1986), for an analysis of political intervention on American college campuses
during the 1950s.
22 RUSSELL JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AGE OF
ACADEME 125 (1987); SCHRECKER, supra note 18, at 340.
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and those associated with the "New Left."'23 Primarily associated
with the largely student and racially white movement, the New Left
consciously avoided the political scientism associated with the Left
of the past and above all had no allegiance to Soviet authority or
ideology.24 This avoidance of Marxist-Leninist ideology was espe-
cially evident in the guiding philosophy of the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society (SDS) which proclaimed through its Port Huron
statement that "the dreams of the older left were perverted by
Stalinism and never re-created." 25 As one of the more visible New
Left organizations on American campuses, SDS was essentially con-
cerned in its early years with revitalizing the democratic process in
America through its committed philosophy of "participatory
democracy." 26
Committed to change, this coalition of students and black activ-
ists became a driving force for major civil rights reforms and served
as the vanguard for the growing student protest against policies
seen by many as anathema to the goals of higher education. Thus,
Lasch notes:
Some of the larger universities ... were directly implicated in the na-
tional defense and in the whole "military-industrial complex" by virtue
of their role in developing and perfecting new instruments of warfare.
To the extent to which they came to depend for support on the gov-
ernment and on the private foundations, they lost their character as
centers of independent learning and critical thought and were swal-
lowed up in the network of the "national purpose" . . . .. 27
The growing involvement of university research with the mili-
tary was to later serve as a primary focus of student protests against
United States involvement in Vietnam. In this way, the New Left
came to represent many different interests and protest groups.
Throughout these protests, the New Left sought to establish an ide-
ological foundation that would provide the basis for building a
movement aimed at changing the social fabric of the industrial
23 See I THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES (Bertell
Olman & Edward Vernoffeds., 1982), for an overview of Marxist influence in American
Universities. See also RICHARD FLACKS, MAKING HISTORY: THE AMERICAN LEFT AND THE
AMERICAN MIND 132 (1988); Alan Hunt, The Radical Critique of Law: An Assessment, 8 INT'L
J. Soc. L. 33 (1980) (discussing "the newness" of the radical critique of law).
24 THE AMERICAN LEF: RADICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
385 (Loren Baritz ed., 1991) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN LEFr]. See also MartinJ. Sklar &
James Weinstein, Socialism and the New Left in AMERICAN LEFT, supra, at 418; Howard Zinn,
Marxism and the New Left, in DISSENT: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADI-
CALISM 355 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1968).
25 Tom Hayden et al., Introduction to THE AMERICAN LEFT, supra note 24, at 397.
26 SeeJOHN P. DIGGINS, THE AMERICAN LEFT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 183 (1973);
SALE, supra note 20, at 8.
27 LASCH, supra note 6, at 316.
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world in which the above mentioned struggles were being played
out. For John Kenneth Galbraith, the universities played an impor-
tant role:
[The universities] led the opposition to the Vietnam War, which forced
the retirement of President Johnson, which are forcing the pace of
present withdrawal from Vietnam, which are leading the battle against
the great corporations on the issue of pollution, and which at the last
Congressional elections retired a score or more of the more egregious
time-servers, military sycophants and hawks.28
Although the direction of the Civil Rights and Anti-War move-
ments was largely peaceful, each had to contend with adherents who
became impatient with traditional methods of recourse and saw
force-and even violence-as a legitimate response to the perceived
injustices of American society.2 9 The ghetto riots of the 1960s and
the student protests at the National Democratic Convention in Chi-
cago in 1968 resulted in wide-spread condemnation by the public
and strong counter-reactive policies by public authorities.30 It was
no surprise to many that "law and order" became a central issue of
the 1968 presidential election. Two years later, in response to the
killing of four students by the National Guard at Kent State Univer-
sity, college students organized strikes at campuses across the coun-
try, effectively bringing the university system to a standstill.
Ironically, the success of the strike can be seen as marking the be-
ginning of the end of the student New Left as a political force in
American society. Unable to stop the war in Vietnam, the revolu-
tionary youth movement envisioned by the New Left was on the
edge of collapse as the 1970s commenced.
C. THE ACADEMY AND PROTEST
While America focused on the protests of blacks and students,
many academics focused on politics.3 1 Faculty members throughout
28 John Kenneth Galbraith, An Adults Guide to New York, Washington and other
Exotic Places, quoted in LIPSET & DOBSON, supra note 6, at 146. For a view of the universi-
ties and protest, see generally Special Issue, The Universities, 13 PUB. INTEREST 3, 3-21
(1968).
29 At the same time that SDS was growing on American campuses, the Progressive
Party (PP) began to characterize SDS as an elitist group of middle-class students. Sub-
scribing to violence and basing its directives upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the PP was
in part responsible for the splintering of the Left during the end of the 1960s. This
splintering and call for violence was not unlike the problems faced by activists in the
Socialist movement in the early part of this century. See generally JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE
DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA: 1912-1925 (1967).
30 See Gordon E. Misner, The Response of Police Agenies, 382 ANNALS 109, 110 (1964);
David Mars, The Federal Government and Protest, 382 ANNALS 120, 127 (1964).
31 The cover of the March 10, 1968 issue of Newsweek proclaimed: "Student Rebels:
How to Tame the Turmoil?" See also Noam Chomsky, The Politicization of the University, in
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many of the nation's colleges and universities voiced concern over
the direction of American politics and advocated a more radical par-
ticipation in national affairs. 32 In 1964, a number of respected his-
torians founded the Socialist Scholars Conference to create a forum
for socialist intellectual work.33 No longer associated with party
functionaries of leftist groups, radicalism and the call for social
change became major topics of discussion among scholars in many
academic disciplines. During the 1960s and early 1970s, some two
dozen "Left" theoretical journals came into existence.3 4 These
journals, representing many of the disciplines in the arts and sci-
ences provided an important forum for dissemination of ideas asso-
ciated with new developments in theory and research. 35 Further,
they provided assurance among many adherents of radicalism that
their political activity had an intellectual foundation to which they
could always refer as critics of society-at-large. Whether the remain-
ingjournals will, in the face of mounting costs and political shifts, be
able to survive the next decade remains to be seen. That so many
were created during the 1960s and 1970s not only says something
about the powerful influence of radical dissent during this period,
but provides a measure of later radical movements as well.3 6
As self-proclaimed critics and activists, scholars saw scholarship
as a means to achieve major social changes in American society. For
these radicals, the unity of theory and action (praxis) became the
cornerstone of all political agendas. For example, the Union of
Radical Sociologists, founded in 1969, called for radical social
change: "the immediate and primary task of the radical sociologist
is to raise public and professional consciousness through radical re-
search and practice as well as to engage in radical organizing on and off
the campus." '3 7
It was during this period of intellectual and political upheaval
that Radical Criminology raised its manifesto of challenge to the
RADICAL PRIORITIES 189, 199-203 (Carlos P. Otero ed., 2d rev. ed. 1981) (discussing the
universities' complicity with the federal government and the role of radical scholarship
in the universities); JACOBY, supra note 22, at 130-90.
32 See RADICAL SOCIOLOGY 3-21 (J. David Colfax &Jack Roach eds., 1971).
33 See PAUL A. ATrEWELL, RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE SIXTIES: A SOCIOL-
OGY OF KNOWLEDGE ANALYSIS 8 (1984).
34 Id at 14-15.
35 Id at 16-17.
36 Unlike Radical Criminology which established the journal, Crime and SocialJustice,
CLS never founded its own journal, nor has become identified with any particular legal
publication. Perhaps, because of the plethora of student-run law journals providing
ready exposure for an intellectual movement represented by professors at major law
schools, this route may have been unnecessary.
37 RADICAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 32, at 18 (emphasis added).
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traditional ideas and teachings of criminology. Since most criminol-
ogists were, at that time, trained in sociology, they were familiar
with Marxist and leftist scholars, and were able to couch their calls
for change within a radical framework.38 For many sociologists and
criminologists, both the legal and the criminal justice systems
needed radical reform if a more equitable society was to be estab-
lished. By the early 197 0s, Radical Criminology had launched a ma-
jor attack on traditional mainstream criminology.3 9
II. RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND CLS: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE
A. THE ORIGINS
Radical Criminology and CLS proponents acknowledge that the
political, civil and student rights movements of the 1960s are essen-
tial to understanding the emergence of radical scholarship that took
place within criminology and legal theory. 40 Prior to the 1960s,
most criminology and legal theory courses were marked by a high
degree of theoretical uniformity and ideological consistency. Stu-
dents were given little, if any, exposure to radical perspectives, espe-
cially those associated with Marxism. In criminology, most research
and theory shared a commitment to the consensus paradigm of
structural-functionalism with its emphasis on the primacy of the so-
cial system and the interrelationship of its institutions rather than on
the individuals or groups who made up the institutions or subsys-
tems.4' Because "equilibrium" of the systems was the hallmark of
those sharing the structural-functional approach, critics claimed that
the approach minimized social conflict and tension, thereby sup-
porting a more politically conservative agenda within sociology and
criminology.42
38 Since the 1960s, a number of colleges and universities have established degree
programs in Criminology and Criminal Justice that do not require courses in Classical
Social Theory.
39 See David Greenberg, Marxist Criminology, in THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOL-
ARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 164, 207 (Bertell Ollman & Edward Vernoff eds., 1986).
40 See William J. Chambliss, Toward a Radical Criminology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 230, (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990); John Henry Schlegel, Notes
Toward an Intimate, Opinionated and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Stud-
ies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (1984); see generally Tony Platt, Prospects for a Radical
Criminology in the United States, 1 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2 (1974); Austin T. Turk, Prospects
and Pitfalls for Radical Criminology: A Critical Response to Platt, 2 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 41
(1975).
41 See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957);
TALCOT' PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1964).
42 See generally GEORGE HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961);
PARSONS, supra note 41, at 513. Not all theorists, however, downplayed conflict in soci-
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The social and political upheavals of the 1960s provided a ma-
jor challenge to structural-functionalists by raising the issue of con-
flict within society to a level of theoretical importance long absent
among social scientists. Faced with a growing number of protests
throughout the country by students, blacks, and the urban poor,
sociologists and criminologists searched for alternative theoretical
models to explain the events taking place.. Further, the personal in-
volvement of many members of Radical Criminology in the anti-war
and civil-rights movements strengthened the call for the develop-
ment of a Radical Criminology that would challenge the prevailing
ideology of liberalism that dominated conventional criminology,43
while seeking "a wider range for research and a broader conceptual-
ization of the [crime] problem."' 44 For these scholars, the legal defi-
nition of crime limited inquiry to behavior officially defined as
criminal by those in power and therefore should be rejected.45
They argued that, to avoid state imposed restrictions on the study of
crime and criminal behavior, what was needed was a conception of
crime based on a human rights perspective. 46 This focus on human
rights and dignity not only broadened the scope of inquiry by radi-
cal criminologists to include "crimes by the state," it also supported
the emphasis given by academics to practice and participation in the
political struggles themselves.47
Although CLS manifested its challenge to legal theory after
Radical Criminology, its members acknowledge that its critical
thrust derives from the same well-spring of political activism associ-
ety. See generally LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956); RALF
DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1959); C. WRIGHT
MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
43 Platt, supra note 40, at 2. In his analysis of Radical Criminology, David Friedrichs
notes that "radical" is suggestive of a fundamental break with mainstream criminology
with a leftist tradition. David 0. Friedrichs, Radical Criminology in the Limited States: An
Interpretive Understanding, in RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: THE COMING CRISES 35, 37 (James
A. Inciardi ed., 1980).
44 Chambliss, supra note 40, at 236. Some of the major figures associated with the
beginning of Radical Criminology include William Chambliss, Barry Krisberg, Tony
Platt, Herman and Julia Schwendinger, Paul Takagi, and Harold Pepinsky. For a de-
scription of the content of courses taught under the rubric of Radical Criminology, see
Barry Krisberg, Teaching Radical Criminology, 1 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 64 (1974).
45 Platt, supra note 40, at 5.
46 See Herman Schwendinger & Julia Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or Guardians of
Human Rights?, 5 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 123 (1970). See also Clayton A. Hartjen, Legalism
and Humanism: A Reply to Schwendinger, 7 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1972).
47 For a review of the cultural and political issues dominating these decades, see
CAMPUS POWER STRUGGLE (Howard S. Becker ed., 1973); CAUTE, supra note 17; DAvID
FARBER, CHICAGO '68 (1988); RONALD FRASER ET AL., 1968: A STUDENT GENERATION IN
REVOLT (1988); GITLIN, supra note 17; UNGER, supra note 10. For further readings in this
area, see The Universities, supra note 28.
1993]
CARDARELLI & HICKS
ated with the radical developments in the varied disciplines
throughout the Academy. 48 Founded in 1977, CLS was viewed as
''a response to a deepening skepticism regarding the ability of Legal
Positivism and liberal legalism to provide satisfactory analysis of law
in a rapidly changing society." 49 Like those movements that pre-
ceded it, CLS was instituted to scrutinize and critically judge the
ways in which law is taught and practiced, as well as its role in main-
taining the status quo of the social structure.50 Dissatisfied with the
empirical thrust of the Law and Society school of thought and the
Sociology of Law as alternatives to the typical analysis of rules, sys-
tems and norms, the early members of CLS took the position that
the road to jurisprudential enlightenment lay in philosophy, not be-
haviorism. 5' As a movement primarily "leftist" in content, CLS
mounted an assault on the traditional legal philosophies guiding the
teaching of law.52 For CLS scholars, any legal theory was merely a
reflection of a political system that dominated and controlled the
existing judicial system.53
In this respect, Radical Criminology and CLS challenged the
prevailing social and political structures as supportive of a capitalist
system in crisis, and more importantly, viewed existing theory and
research as little more than ideological justification for a political
economy that supported the status quo in American society.54 In
rejecting the ideology of capitalism, both movements attempted to
establish a sustained level of criticism that was linked with political
48 See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1534.
49 Russell, supra note 10, at 4.
50 Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, I1 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 370 (1982-83). See also Russell,
supra note 10, at 10. For a criticism of the way law is taught, see generally Jay M.
Feinman, The Failure of Legal Education and the Promise of Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDoZO L.
REV. 739 (1985); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIER-
ARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); Karl E. Klare, The Law School Curriculum
in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (1982).
51 Allan C. Hutchinson & PatrickJ. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Schol-
ars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1984).
52 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, YALE REV. L. Soc.
ACTION 71 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, First Year Law Teaching as Political Action, I LAw &
Soc. PROBS. 47 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Positive and Normative Elements in Legal Educa-
tion: A Response, 8 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 263 (1985).
53 See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1021-22
(1981); Alan Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1230, 1236
(1981).
54 See THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 16, at 4. For
Kairys, law provides a false legitimacy to existing social and power relations. In an ear-
lier analysis, C. Wright Mills convincingly argued that liberalism had become irrelevant
to American life, supra note 42, at 242-297.
[Vol. 84
RADICALISM IN LA W AND CRIMINOLOGY
action and radical change.55
B. THE CHALLENGE TO ORTHODOXY
As the United States entered the 1960s, liberalism-with its em-
phasis on rationality, individual freedom and public discourse-was
firmly rooted in the social fabric of society. 56 Strongly committed to
democratic balancing of interests with its reliance on the neutrality
of the rule of law, liberalism became the chief target of the New Left
in its search for alternative models to explain the growing social and
political unrest that dominated American politics. In confronting
this unrest, for example, adherents of Radical Criminology claimed
that traditional criminology-with its acceptance of a legalistic-state
definition of crime, its claim of reformism as the goal of the criminal
justice system, and its adherence to the behaviorist paradigm and
value-free social research-were all part of the prevailing liberal phi-
losophy that saw consensus and rationality as being at the heart of
the social system.57 Thus, liberalism masked the domination of the
public interest with its reliance on the objectivity of rational choice
and the majoritarianism of those in power. Further, because liber-
alism reinforced the prevailing view that "radical change is utopian
and visionary, thereby helping to impede the development of revo-
lutionary and political movements," it had to be rejected. 58
In rejecting a legalistic definition of crime, radical criminolo-
gists argued that those in power used the legal order to impose their
own interests by force on society, thereby protecting their property
and physical safety from those without power and privilege.5 9 To
overcome the inherent limitations of the legalistic definition, radical
criminologists argued for a conception of crime anchored in the vio-
lation of human rights, thus raising to observation those activities
free of criminal sanctions but destructive of the social fabric.60
55 Id. See also Tushnet, supra note 10, at 511.
56 See GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 9; LASCH, supra note 1, at 476. See generally C. Wright
Mills, Liberal Values in the Modern World, in POWER, POLITCS AND PEOPLE: THE COLLECTED
ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT MILLS 187 (Irving L. Horowitz ed., 1963).
57 See Platt, supra note 40, at 2-4; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 46, at
144 (arguing that liberalism is an elitist ideology that serves to perpetuate social inequal-
ity in the name of equality); John F. Galliher, The Life and Death of Liberal Criminology, 2
CONTEMP. CRISES 245 (1978). For a critique of "value-free" social research, see Alvin
W. Gouldner, Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology, 9 Soc. PROBS. 199 (1962);
IAN TAYLOR ET AL., THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE (1973);
and Gresham M. Sykes, The Rise of Critical Criminology, 65J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 206
(1974).
58 Platt, supra note 40, at 4.
59 Chambliss, supra note 40, at 237-238.
60 Herman Schwendinger &Julia Schwendinger, Social Class and the Definition of Crime,
7 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 4, 8-10 (1977).
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Given this perspective, it followed that the "state and legal appara-
tus ... should be a central focus of investigation as a criminogenic
institution." 61 Only in this way can one begin to understand the
cultural and economic dynamics underlying criminal behavior and
social deviance. In keeping with this mandate, radical criminologists
engaged in a sustained attack on the positivist paradigm manifested
in the functional and psychopathological models of crime and devi-
ance that dominated criminology during this period. 62
While not rejecting the necessity of reform for the criminal jus-
tice system, Radical Criminology called for the replacement of the
traditional liberal approach to crime control with one that was
linked to an analysis of the political economy and the exploitative
social relations associated with the existence of criminal conduct.63
Once these exploitative conditions were established, the necessary
political activity to bring about change would be forthcoming.64 For
radical criminologists, the unity of theory and practice were neces-
sary to create a more humane and egalitarian society.6 5 Unlike
traditional criminology, the distinguishing characteristic of Radical
Criminology "is its emphasis on praxis (human action) as a means of
bringing about changes in society and ascertaining the 'adequacy'
(i.e. 'truth') of radical criminological theories upon which the
changes in society are based." 66 This commitment to practice which
is continually reaffirmed through the writings of Radical Criminol-
ogy and CLS takes on added significance with the incorporation of
Marxist ideas in establishing a theoretical base.67 Because the Marx-
ian notion of praxis is believed to be inseparable from theory, for
radical criminologists "the struggle or praxis to change society...
will be revolutionary." 68 Such explicit and definitive commitment to
praxis must not be treated lightly. It was a significant factor in the
sometimes heated reactions by traditional criminologists and soci-
ologists because they viewed their work as being largely value-free,
or at the least value-neutral, in its content.
This is especially evident in the now familiar proclamation by
Daniel Bell on the "end of ideology" in the West. 69 In his analysis,
61 Platt, supra note 40, at 6.
62 For an overview of the models dominating traditional American Criminology, see
Walter C. Reckless, American Criminology, 8 CRIMINOLOGY 4 (1970).
63 Editorial, 4 CRIME & SOC. JusT. 1, 2 (1975).
64 Platt, supra note 40, at 5-7.
65 Bohm, supra note 10, at 578-80; Hunt, supra note 23, at 39.
66 Bohm, supra note 10, at 578.
67 Trubek, supra note 10, at 606.
68 Bohm, supra note 10, at 579.
69 See DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS
IN THE FIFTIES (rev. ed. 1962).
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Bell argued that the ideologies which emerged from the nineteenth
century were exhausted; that change itself no longer had philo-
sophic roots.70 For Bell, the end of ideology marked the close of an
era dominated by a leftist formula for social change. According to
Lasch, even radicals shared Bell's view of capitalism as achieving "a
remarkable stability." 7' The events of the last three decades, espe-
cially those in Eastern Europe, have, however, shown the futility in-
herent in any attempt to predict the burial of deeply seated beliefs
and ideologies.7 2 Ironically, Bell's promise of an empirical "ladder
to the City of Heaven" as being society's best hope for achieving
utopia, has been given the burial he so wanted for ideology.73
Throughout the decade following Bell's work, the arguments
against a "value-free" sociology grew, both in their scope and ac-
ceptance, and exposed for observation the underlying conflict ex-
isting in all social orders.74
Like Radical Criminology, CLS rejected the liberal justification
and explanation of the way things were. Despite the enormous so-
cial changes of the 1960s, the theory of law remained focused on
traditional nineteenth century issues such as the relationship be-
tween law and morality or the nature of legal obligation. Modern
legal theory reflected the complacency and comfort of an earlier
time when institutional competence could have been thought to set-
tle matters about the interaction of law, politics and society.7 5 In
contrast, CLS argued that the dominant interpretive model of law as
a neutral medium for the accommodation of competing interests
"represents the status quo and acts as a mask for exploitation and
injustice."76 For CLS, a major goal was to expose the contradictions
and incoherence of liberal legalism,"7 whose "apparently rational
discourse" conceals "social power."78 Legal reasoning was said to
be political and ideological exactly in the way it differentiated itself
from both politics and ordinary talk by representing legal relations
as if they were the same as social relations. The result was to ex-
70 Id. at 393.
71 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE AGONY OF THE AMERICAN LEFr 172 (1969).
72 See ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970).
73 BELL, supra note 69, at 405.
74 Gouldner, supra note 57, at 199.
75 See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 J. L. REFORM 561, 569 (1988);
Richard Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 223, 257
(1981).
76 Russell, supra note 10, at 10.
77 Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORDJ. L. STUDIES 1, 4-7 (1986);
UNGER, supra note 10, at 15-42.
78 James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 685, 688 (1985).
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clude the personal, subjective and experienced world and to affirm
an objective, formal and value-free discourse from which similar
political influence was supposedly excluded.79
This deep structural critique and phenomenological enlighten-
ment proceeded primarily by way of an analysis of how law repre-
sented itself to be in its own texts; that is, cases and materials
themselves, rather than in the manner in which law was exper-
ienced. This approach was consistent with CLS's mission, which fo-
cused on legal thinking and education in the nation's elite law
schools. It attacked "formalism," whereby legal technicians apply
pure legal reasoning to reach conclusions independent of personal
values and political choices,80 as well as "objectivism," which is the
belief that "the sources of law embody and sustain a defensible
scheme of human association" while displaying "an intelligible
moral order." 8' As a result, "[t]he Critical Legal Studies Movement
... undermined the central ideas of modern legal thought and put
another conception of law in their place. This conception implies a
view of society and informs a practice of politics." 8 2 The plasticity
of categories, fluidity of social contexts, and contingency of all given
premises with which such a politics begin are all derived from the
same vision as is the critique of legal reasoning.8 3 It is the indeter-
minacy of concepts that permits "the purely instrumental use of
legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims." 8 4 Indeter-
minacy became the key that unlocked the liberal paradigm of law
and its supposed separateness from politics and society.8 5 CLS used
the premises of traditional legal theory against itself to demonstrate
that legal indeterminacy was proportionate, in fact, to political and
social incoherence.86
Therefore, like Radical Criminology, the challenge of CLS,
while specific to its academic discipline, reached into the very heart
of modern America. For CLS, the incoherence of liberalism lay in
"its inability to resolve the fundamental contradiction between indi-
vidual and community."8 7 The experience of belonging and the
79 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1156 (1985).
80 UNGER, supra note 10, at 1; Russell, supra note 10, at 8, 18.
81 Trubek, supra note 10, at 591.
82 UNGER, supra note 10, at 1.
83 ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 1 (1987).
84 Trubek, supra note 10, at 591.
85 See Russell, supra note 10, at 8; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1524; UNGER, supra note
10, at 1-4; Joseph Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 10-14 (1984).
86 Hunt, supra note 77, at 33.
87 Id. See also GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 127.
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claim of obedience were not reciprocated. Indeed, liberalism was
not only just an ideology for CLS; it was a false one at that. Thus,
according to CLS, the process by which "world-views" such as liber-
alism give meaning to members of society and become embedded in
legal consciousness has to be grasped before social change can be-
gin.88 The critical thrust of CLS revolves around the view that
"legal scholarship can be a kind of transformative political ac-
tion."8 9 This assumes that political theories such as liberalism de-
rive their meaning and constitutive power by claiming to be true,
which in the case of liberalism meant neutral, determinate, objective
and fair. It also assumes that such theories or "world views" can be
undermined by refuting their claims to truth.90 This placed a heavy
burden on CLS to provide "evidence that legal consciousness does
affect what goes on in society .... [and this means] . . . that the
project of Critical understanding must be extended to studies of the
construction of meaning and its relationship to action at all
levels." 91
Radical scholars in legal theory and criminology shared a deep
commitment to the transformation of prevailing discourse and polit-
ical practice through an alternative scholarship rooted in praxis,
whereby the social construction of meaning is vulnerable to change
once its assumptions are brought to light.92 For Radical Criminol-
ogy and CLS, the assumptions of consensus, value-neutrality and
scientific rationality not only minimized the alienation and disaffec-
tion of many; they also masked the use of law to maintain the eco-
nomic advantages of those in power, as well as the coercive power of
the state. Both movements purported to reveal not only how liber-
alism fails society by its own terms to meet expectations, but how it
is used by certain forces to create the illusion that it is the best of all
possible systems. Together, these two movements comprised a
crashing wave of radicalism against the dike of liberty, equality and
rights erected to protect the haves from the have-nots. Drawing
upon Marxism and neo-Marxism, the Frankfurt School, structural-
ism and phenomenology, these movements constructed bridges be-
tween the visions of the traditional left and the possibilities in
88 Trubek, supra note 10, at 591-92.
89 Id. at 591.
90 Id. at 592.
91 Id. at 612.
92 For a thorough analysis of this project and the qualification that "the indetermi-
nacy critique cannot really dissolve someone's belief in legal authority... so long as this
critique remains only at the rational or manifest level," see Peter Gabel, The Phenomenol-




achieving civil rights and political change after the apparent success
of protest movements throughout the 1960s.9 3
C. TOWARD A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
At the outset of our analysis, it is essential to note that neither
Radical Criminology nor CLS can be identified with a unitary body
of scholarship. 94 Diverse viewpoints are readily distinguishable
throughout the writings of both schools of thought. As with any
intellectual movement, as new ideas are raised, discussed and chal-
lenged, it is all the more likely that alternative theoretical perspec-
tives will emerge to be challenged themselves.95 Neither Radical
Criminology nor CLS has been immune to this dynamic. Thus, for
Radical Criminology, the rejection of traditional classical and posi-
tivistic paradigms necessitated a search for theoretical structures to
support the call for a more humanistic and historical criminology. 96
1. Radical Criminology and the Revolt Against Positivism
A major effort in this direction resulted from the much dis-
cussed 1973 work of Taylor, Walton and Young, entitled "The New
Criminology. ' '9 7 In their proposal for a "social theory of deviance,"
the authors argued for a criminology that would "be able to bring
politics back into the discussion of what were previously technical
issues" and address the "need to deal with society as a totality."98
The authors were especially critical of the role that biological and
psychological perspectives played in the explanation of criminal be-
havior, and advocated a political economy of criminal action that
emphasized the social nature of deviance.99 In criticizing traditional
criminology for its failure to incorporate the political economy into
93 See, e.g., Donald HJ. Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal
Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 379 (1982).
94 See Russell, supra note 10, at 4; Tushnet, supra note 10, at 510; see generally RADICAL
CRIMINOLOGY: THE COMING CRISIS, supra note 10.
95 See Henry & Milovanovic, supra note 8, at 294.
96 See Robert F. Meier, The New Criminology: Continuity in Criminological Theory, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 461, 462-63 (1977). Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra
note 46, at 142-49.
97 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 57.
98 Id. at 278.
99 Id. at 268-7 1. For critical reviews of "New Criminology," see Elliott Currie, The
New Criminology, CRIME & SOC. JusT. 109-13 (1974) (book review); Jeff Coulter, What's
Wrong with the New Criminology, 22 SOCIAL REV. 119-35 (1974) (book review); Charles E.
Reasons, The "Old" and the "New" Criminology, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 560-64
(1975) (book review); David Schichor, The New Criminology: Some Critical Issues, 20 BRrr.J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-19 (1980); Denis Szabo, Some Thoughts on the New Criminology, 65 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554-59 (1975) (book review).
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the dominant explanatory models of criminal behavior, Taylor and
his co-authors became part of a growing number of criminologists
who were incorporating Marxist and conflict theory in their concep-
tual approaches to crime and criminal justice. 100
Because of the historical importance of Marx's writings to soci-
ology, from which most criminologists traced their intellectual
roots, Marxist theory offered a readily available basis for interpret-
ing the social order. By turning to Marxism, radical criminologists
rejected the consensus theories that had long dominated sociology
and criminology. The resort to a Marxist framework was under-
scored by an editorial in the 1975 issue of Crime and Social Justice: A
Journal of Radical Criminology, where several scholars argued that the
Journal was committed to a "search for socialist solutions to the
problem characterized as 'crime' in the U.S. [and] theoretically, we
view a Marxist analysis as the most promising framework for
study." 10' 1 The move toward a Marxist framework was especially ev-
ident in the work of Richard Quinney, long associated with Radical
Criminology.
Marxist theory and practice provide the necessary basis for a socialist
criminology... [and] Marxism is the most suitable and all-embracing
philosophy in which to produce our criminology. We will produce a
criminology that takes us beyond capitalist ideology and practice to
the everyday reality of the class struggle. As this takes place we are
creating the theory and practice for the transition to socialism and for
the essential transition to communism.102
According to Bohm, radical criminologists focused not only on
the political economy of crime. Even more importantly, they held
that "it is the class struggle both between and among those who
own and control the means of production and distribution and
those who do not that is the source of all crime in capitalist socie-
ties." 103 Further, because Marxism focuses on the inter-relation-
ships between the state, law, crime and the capitalist mode of
production, it provided radical criminologists with a critical frame-
work for examining the underlying processes by which the state de-
fines some behavior as criminal, while excluding from criminal
sanctions that which is destructive of society. 10 4 Since the economy
100 See Bernard, supra note 8, at 363-66.
101 Editorial, supra note 63, at 1.
102 Richard Quinney, The Production of a Marxist Criminology, 2 COSTEMP. CRISES 277,
289 (1978).
103 Bohm, supra note 10, at 570.
104 For further explanation of Marxist Criminology, see generally Quinney, supra note
102; Bohm, supra note 10; Pat O'Mally, Marxist Theory andMarxist Criminology, 29 CRIME &
SOC.JUsTICE 70 (1987). See also Ronald Hinch, Marxist Criminology in the 1970s: Clarifying
the Clutter, 19 CRIME & SOC. JUSTICE 65 (1983).
CARDARELLI & HICKS
and its organizing principles are considered to be heavily entwined
with the institutions of law and criminal justice, Marxist-based theo-
ries that view structural contradictions as central to society provided
radical scholars with a viable point of departure from the traditional
theories that dominated the social sciences. 10 5
The importance of Marxist writings to Radical Criminology
should not, however, overshadow the fact that many Radical Crimi-
nologists did not view themselves as "Marxists." Radical Criminol-
ogy was both diverse and fragmented; no one body of theory guided
the work of those committed to a more humanistic criminology. In
this respect, Friedrichs in his interpretation of Radical Criminology,
notes that "[o]ne suspects that most radical criminologists were
'radicalized' by the historical events and circumstances [of the 1960s]
and only then turned to Marx for a theoretical framework through
which their radicalism could be expressed."'0 6 Friedrichs' insight
points to the fact that collective movements can arise before a well-
established theoretical foundation is agreed upon by the members
of such movements. The same can be said of CLS. More important,
perhaps, is an agreed upon political perspective from which dis-
course will emanate. Once a movement gathers momentum, the
search for a theoretical perspective to support the ideological thrust
is all the more likely. This is especially true for those who are com-
mitted to the theory-praxis framework for achieving social change.
However, the fact that alternative theoretical perspectives are likely,
regardless of the ideological thrust of the movement, exemplifies
our argument that radical theory will be influenced by the historical
circumstances that it attempts to confront and interpret.
At the same time that radical criminologists were arguing for a
transcendence of liberalism and positivism, a growing interest in the
"critical theory" of society was generated by the Frankfurt School of
German social theory. 10 7 Because the Frankfurt School had given a
pre-eminent place to the rejection of positivism/empiricism, while
emphasizing the vital connection between theory and praxis, it was
natural that critical theory would be applied to criminology even
though it implicated much more.'08 Groves and Sampson have ar-
gued that critical theory can assist criminology by offering a critical
interpretation of the relationship between structural characteristics
and criminal behavior.' 0 9 For critical theorists, crime represents an
105 ALAN A. BLOCK & WILLIAMJ. CHAMBLISS, ORGANIZING CRIME 12 (1981).
106 Friedrichs, supra note 43, at 38.
107 See Groves & Sampson, supra note 8 passim.
108 Id. at 67-68.
109 Id. at 68.
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example of the cultural and structural irrationalities which typify so-
cial relations under capitalism. 110
At the time of their analysis in 1986, Groves and Sampson com-
mented on the rather few attempts to apply "critical theory" to
criminology. They noted that "[w]hat is surprising is the scant at-
tention paid to the Frankfurt tradition by radical and critical crimi-
nologists, especially given the enormous amount of scholarship
devoted to Habermas in recent years." ''  Perhaps this can be ex-
plained in part by the Frankfurt School's growing departure from
Marxist theory. 112 This is not to diminish the influence of critical
theory, but rather to point out that it "was only one current of
thought in a very broad critical renewal of Marxist and radical theo-
ries" that were in dominance during this same period. 1 3 Perhaps,
also, the scant attention paid to critical theory by American crimi-
nologists derived in part from a lack of familiarity with the works of
the Frankfurt School, many of which were not translated into Eng-
lish until the early 1970s. A further reason, no doubt, derives from
the confusion associated with the seemingly indiscriminate use of
the terms "radical," "conflict" and "critical" to describe both theory
and criminology throughout the period. 114 Thus, even while Criti-
cal Criminology became closely associated with the work of Taylor,
Walton and Young, there is no reference to the critical theory of the
Frankfurt School in their call for a "new criminology."' 15 The con-
fusion is further illustrated in a critique of Radical Criminology by
Gresham Sykes, who argues for the replacement of "radical" with
the term "critical" to describe the growing criticism by radical crimi-
nologists. The "critical criminology" of which Sykes writes, how-
ever, has little in common with the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School.1 6 Part of the confusion stems from the fact that critical the-
ory has itself changed over time, both in its meaning and objectives.
Beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno between the World Wars,
and ending perhaps with Marcuse in the 1960s, critical theory can-
not be identified with a particular social theory or ideology, or even
a specific criminology. Whatever the reasons for confusion, radical
10 Id. at 72-75.
111 Id. at 58 n.1.
112 See TOM BoTrOMORE, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 55 (1984); Groves & Sampson, supra
note 8, at 75.
11S BOTrOMORE, supra note 112, at 49.
114 For a general idea of the many words used to refer to Radical Criminology and
theory, see Bohm, supra note 10, at 565; Bernard, supra note 8, at 362-63; Sykes, supra
note 57, at 208; Friedrichs, supra note 43, at 35.
115 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 57, at 278-282.
116 Sykes, supra note 57, at 208-09.
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criminologists continued to challenge traditional ideas about crime
and criminal justice throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while seeking
to establish an alternative paradigm for understanding the existence
of crime in society.
In a recent analysis of some of the issues associated with crimi-
nology and critical theory, Thomas and O'Maolchata argue that crit-
ical criminology should not be viewed as a theory but as "a different
construction of reality, which applies an alternative discourse and
perspective to interpretations of social control."' 17 It is, they argue,
a method or approach to inquiry that rejects the metaphor of tradi-
tional criminology with its emphasis on positivism, and adopts in-
stead a metaphor of "critique" which "requires the capability to
explore alternative meanings without constraint."' 18 In distinguish-
ing traditional criminology from critical criminology along the di-
mension of metaphor, the authors argue that the debate between
each centers "on what shall count as knowledge, and on whether
traditional objectivistic science can claim to be the only approach to
'theory' and 'knowledge.' "119 For critical criminologists, the an-
swer is obvious: theory is just one aspect of knowledge, and there is
nothing incompatible between critical thought and empiricism. 120
Based on this premise, critical criminology has recently been
viewed as an "umbrella" term which includes several perspectives
that continue to undergo revision. 121 These perspectives include
"left-realism", whose advocates (mostly British) "attempt to recon-
cile radical theory with realistic social policy"; 122 "peacemaking"
criminology, which calls for justice and mercy through the empow-
erment of the disadvantaged; 123 and "feminist" criminology, with its
focus on gender, which argues that the criminal justice system plays
a significant role in maintaining the place of women in a male domi-
nated society.124 Also included is "postmodernist" criminology, in-
117 Thomas & O'Maolchata, supra note 8, at 145.
118 Id. at 147, 154.
119 Id. at 156-57.
120 Id. at 157.
121 Henry & Milovanovic, supra note 8, at 294.
122 Thomas & O'Maolchata, supra note 8, at 159. See generally Jock Young, The Tasks
Facing a Realist Criminology, 11 CONTEMP. CRISES 337 (1987); John Lea, Left Realism: A
Defense, 11 CONTEMP. CRISES 357 (1987); REALIST CRIMINOLOGY: CRIME CONTROL AND
POLICING IN THE 1990s (John W. Lowman & Brian D. MacLean eds., 1992).
123 Thomas & O'Maolchata, supra note 8, at 160-61. See generally CRIMINOLOGY AS
PEACEMAKING (Harold E. Pepinsky & Richard Quinney eds., 1991).
124 Thomas & O'Maolchata, supra note 8, at 162. See generally Meda Chesney-Lind,
Doing Feminist Criminology, 13 CRIMINOLOGIST 1 (1988); Sally S. Simpson, Feminist Theory,
Crime andJustice, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 605 (1989); Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Fem-
inism and Criminology, 5 JUST. Q. 497 (1988); Maureen Cain, Towards Transgression: New
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cluding those perspectives emphasizing semiotics and post-
structuralism.125 While there may be no agreed upon meaning for
the concept "postmodernism," the primary focus is on the changes
taking place in contemporary culture. Such changes are interpreted
through the process of "deconstruction" which attempts to deci-
pher how the rules upon which the social order is structured "shape
hierarchical power relationships both in the social structure and in
interaction." 1 26
In a similar fashion to CLS, as we will soon note, class, gender
and multi-culturalism, once subsumed under the ideological um-
brella of Radical Criminology, appear now to have developed into
separate schools of thought, each with its own agenda. Like Critical
Criminology, there is also a Division on Women and Crime within
the American Society of Criminology (ASC). And, while it can be'
argued that such divisions do not of themselves preclude intellectual
discourse, they provide a further example of the move toward spe-
cialization and potential fragmentation.
These diverse schools of criminology are said to derive their
unity from adherence to "social critique" or "critical thinking,"
which argues that one can change his or her "subjective interpreta-
tions [and] objective conditions by thinking about and then acting
on the world."1 27 Whether critical thinking will continue to provide
a sense of unity in an increasingly therapeutic culture remains in
question. 128 What is evident, however, is the continuing influence
of critical theory in terms of its concern with the political signifi-
cance of social class and its critique of ideology. These concerns
remain a fundamental focus of Radical Criminology (now Critical
Criminology), 129 and also underlie much of the agenda of CLS.
Directions in Feminist Criminology, 18 INT. J. Soc. L. 1 (1990); Special Issue, Women and
CriminalJustice Education, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 165 (1992).
125 Thomas & O'Maolchata, supra note 8, at 163.
126 Id. at 164.
127 Id. at 147.
128 For a critical interpretation of this concept, see PHILIP RiEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE
THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FArrH AFTER FREUD 232 (1966).
129 The changes in the designated names that radical members use to describe their
movements sometimes shows the transformation of those radical movements. In 1977,
for example, when the journal CRIME AND JUSTICE merged with ISSUES AND CRIMINOL-
OGY, the subtitle "A Journal of Radical Criminology" was eliminated. A similar experi-
ence took place at the East Coast Socialist Sociology Conference in 1974; at the
conference, radical scholars "overwhelmingly agreed" not to use the terms "Marxist" or
"radical" in the title of the organization, reasoning that these terms were too narrow and
potentially divisive. See Ted Goertzel, Report on the East Coast Socialist Sociology Conference,
in IV THE INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST 61-62 (1974).
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2. CLS and the Challenge to Legal Reasoning
It has been said that CLS is interpretive scholarship with both a
particular subject and a distinct intent-"the interpretation of the
legal consciousness of capitalist societies, to the end of social trans-
formation."'' 30 As modern as this sounds, and indeed the origins of
CLS lie in the 1970s, the roots of CLS reach back into the early
twentieth century. 3 1 American legal theory has always had a dis-
tinct radical wing, beginning with Holmes' attack on formalism in
1905 in Lochner v. New York 132 and Roscoe Pound's call in the follow-
ing years for a Sociological Jurisprudence, based on the human con-
dition, not assumed first principles. 133 In the 1930s, Legal Realism
found a home in some law schools for its critique of conceptual rea-
soning-that is, law's dogmatic reliance on rules as objective and
given, not tools for instrumentally chosen policies-and most im-
portantly for its critique of the idea that law could be neutral and
separate from social purposes and ends. 134 Just as Sociological Ju-
risprudence found favor with those reformers who made up the Pro-
gressive Movement and "criticized judges for being unresponsive to
social and economic conditions," so too were the Realists politically
wedded to the New Deal. They shared the era's belief that it was
possible to identify a coherent public interest from which policies to
further this interest could be extrapolated. 13 5
This combination of theories about judicial activism, policy
analysis, and the relationship between the political and judicial
branches of government sustained much thinking about law until
the civil rights movement transformed its deep complacency. 136
130 Trubek, supra note 10, at 606.
131 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1515, 1523, 1533.
132 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
133 See generally MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM 103, 108 (1957); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 104-115 (1978) [hereinafter PATTERNS].
134 See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 376-87
(1985). For commentary on the unity of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism,
see ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 36 (1982).
For an introduction to the dispute between Pound and Llewellyn, see PATTERNS, supra
note 133, at 121, 124-132.
135 See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1674 (1982); ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVE-
MENT IN LAW 39 (1978).
136 G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual His-
tory, 40 Sw. LJ. 819, 825-830 (1986). It is interesting to note that, for Tushnet and
others, parental influence greatly affected their legal philosophy. Tushnet, for example,
explains that one of his "formative legal experience[s]" was "the law's half-hearted de-
fense of civil liberties against McCarthyism, not the civil rights movement." Tushnet,
supra note 9, at 1535.
[Vol. 84
RADICALISM IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY
The challenge came in the form of the Law and Society Movement's
empirical description of the gap between the law in the books and
the law in action.' 3 7 Like Radical Criminology, the movement
viewed the law as not serving the whole of society very well. It is
worth bearing in mind, therefore, that CLS is another in the line of
radical legal philosophies to shake up such complacency, even
though it claims to be an heir of Legal Realism in particular. 38
Tushnet has said that CLS is "the direct descendant of [Legal] Real-
ism and the Law-and-Society Movement" of the 1960s, at least in
that it denies the autonomy of law.' 39 He suggests that CLS "is best
understood as a return to the primary intellectual insights of Real-
ism unaffected by the political diversions that led many Realists to
the New Deal and its aftermath."' 40 For CLS, these insights show
the rules of law to be indeterminate, contradictory and contin-
gent.' 4 1 CLS has furthered this realism by invoking the idea that
rationality itself might be problematic, so that the role of "the rule
of law" in affirming the political neutrality of law may be a mythic
one of maintaining a belief in the naturalness of the social world. 42
This highlights an important difference between CLS and Legal
Realism. "The Realist disenchantment with legal formalism was
pragmatic .... [It] provided no guidance for legal practitioners...
nor a framework for the policy concerns of legislators."'' 43 In con-
trast, "critical scholars are motivated by a much broader political
objective within which it is 'the law' itself that is 'the problem'."' 44
In framing this broader objective, CLS has drawn upon many differ-
ent theories, each strand perhaps tending to cultivate a separate di-
mension of the critical project. In this respect, CLS has identified
itself as a movement or conference but disavowed any program or
137 See HuNTr, supra note 135, at 44; White, supra note 136, at 830-38. Tushnet has
claimed that the Law and Society Movement "ignored the ideological functions of law"
and treated law as if it were or should be simply molded by society. Mark Tushnet,
Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's 'A History of
American Law', 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81, 83 (reviewing LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (1973)).
138 For a list of such explicit statements connecting CLS and Legal Realism, see
White, supra note 136, at 820. White's article analyzes this connection, finds a missing
link, and questions why CLS should claim to be the heir of any movement lest it become
"domesticated" as did Legal Realism. Id. at 843.
139 Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction,
36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1984).
140 Id. at 628. See also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 505, 507.
141 Peller, supra note 79, at 1151, 1222..
142 Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLrrIcs OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 288 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Boyle, supra note 78, 706.
143 See Hunt, supra note 77, at 43.
144 Id.; see also MARK KELMAN, A GuIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12-14 (1987).
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key beliefs, except insofar as its separate dimensions intersect-ar-
guably most often at the point of "the indeterminacy of law."' 14 5
Further, CLS' cultural radicals, neo-Marxists, and post-structuralists
offer different emphases of this indeterminacy, relative to social or-
ganization, liberalism and legal reasoning.
Thus, there are those within CLS whose work builds upon the
theories of Marx and Weber, combining an emphasis upon econom-
ics and power with a functionalist analysis of ideology and hegem-
ony to make sense of the notion of the "relative" autonomy of
law.146 The point of departure for this view hinges on the thesis
that "law and legal doctrine reflect, confirm and reshape the social
divisions and hierarchies inherent in a type or stage of social organi-
zation such as 'capitalism.' "147 The central problem is to elucidate
how law is legitimate-because it is merely the framework of the
state in the form of the rule of law, which balances competing inter-
ests-yet not also illegitimate because it is also captured by some of
these same interests. 48 The law, therefore, cannot be fully deter-
mined by economic interests or power as if merely superstructure,
but neither is it functionally neutral and autonomous. Rather, it is
"relatively autonomous." 149
Not only does this mean that law is political in part; it also
means that it is socially constituted, and thus plays a role itself in the
constitution of social consciousness about law. In between these
two extremes lies "the collective consciousness of the interpreting
community."' 150 For Trubek, the concept of "meaning" plays a cen-
tral role in CLS, in that "consciousness, culture and social organiza-
tion are mutually interrelated and reinforcing systems about man
and society. Together they constitute a meaningful whole. Individ-
uals understand the world in terms of these structures of meaning
and this understanding affects their actions."' 15' There is an impor-
tant shift here in focus from the law to society as a whole. 152 Diffi-
cult questions remain, however, especially as to the extent to which
legal consciousness shapes beliefs as well as the locus of the origin
145 Singer, supra note 85, at 5.
146 Hunt, supra note 77, at 8-10; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1525. See also, Donald F.
Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 317 (1987).
147 UNGER, supra note 10, at 21.
148 For commentary on the problems with instrumental Marxism from CLS' point of
view and the resulting need for law to appear fair and equal, see Gordon, supra note 142,
at 285-86.
149 Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Autonomy'of
the Law, 11 L. & Soc. REV. 571, 585 (1976).
150 Boyle, supra note 78, at 728.
151 Trubek, supra note 10, at 604.
152 Hunt, supra note 77, at 11.
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of the dominant legal consciousness.1 53 The early impulse towards
bringing to light consciousness or experience, in the sense of our
lived-through meaning, was central to the phenomenology of Ga-
bel.15 4 This different focus brings to the fore the relationship of self
to others, and especially the alienation experienced by the modem
subject.1 55 Such an analysis of legal experience rests upon another
key CLS concept: the fundamental contradiction between polarities
and incommensurable values, especially self and others, which arises
because "relations with others are both necessary to and incompati-
ble with our freedom."' 56 The fundamental contradiction concept,
which has since been recanted by CLS scholars, allows "an account
of the contingency and indeterminacy of the legal process."' 157
This leads in two directions. One is toward indeterminacy
which draws upon the method of immanent critique of the Frankfurt
School, and upon linguistic theory from Saussure to Derrida, via
Wittgenstein. 158 The other direction leans toward a reconstitution
of ethical life and a reordering of society so that all may participate
in its flourishing.' 59 Unger in particular has explored the personal
experience of living in the liberal political system critiqued by CLS
and has attempted to develop a general theory that allows an under-
standing of the dynamic interrelatedness of self, others, society and
human nature.160
The more precarious the bonds of common existence and belief
among men as minds, the less are they able to express their conscious-
ness through the social medium of symbols, and therefore, the less are
they secure in the experience of individuality that arises from con-
sciousness. [Yet] the more intimate the similarity of experience and
reflection among individuals, the less of a basis does individual iden-
tity seem to have. 161
153 Id. See also Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 25, 26
(1980).
154 See generally Peter Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a
Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977); Gabel, supra note 92.
155 ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 91-273 (1984); Gabel,
supra note 92, at 1566-99.
156 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 286 BUFF. L. REV. 205,
211-17 (1979). See also Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 14, 36-45 (1984); Hunt, supra note 77, at 24.
157 Hunt, supra note 77, at 21.
158 See Brosnan, supra note 146, at 308, 332, 360; Boyle, supra note 78, at 708, 756;
Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 451, 457, 464, 489, 491 (1987).
159 See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Towards a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 291, 300, 327, 341-48, 365 (1985).
160 UNGER, supra note 155, at vii; ROBERTO M. UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CON-
STRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987).
161 ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITIcs 215 (1975).
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Not everyone in CLS subscribes to Unger's vision or his pro-
gram, and this may reflect both a general uncertainty about his role
as spokesman, mentor and prophet, as well as doubt over whether
CLS has a program.' 62
What connects Unger's vision of empowered citizens and the
indeterminacy of the law is the view that CLS can shatter "con-
gealed forms of life by showing that they have no particular integ-
rity. And whatever makes that demonstration effective-utopian
yearnings, close analysis of legal texts, concrete proposals-is part
of the program."'163 Social contexts, no more than the pedagogy of
the case-method or deductive reasoning, do not constrain all alter-
natives and thus cannot determine outcomes. It is only in this sense
that law is indeterminate; it is not arbitrary nor is it unpredictable;
rather it refers beyond itself. "[W]e can explain judicial decisions
only by reference to criteria outside the scope of the judge's formal
justification."' 64 Whatever regularities exist are not "necessary con-
sequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules."1 65 There-
fore, it becomes a matter of critical urgency to break out of the
constraints of traditional legal reasoning. 166 The origin of this lies
in the application of critical theory's immanent critique to law; that
is, confronting what exists with its social conception or with the val-
ues it claims to realize.1 67 In this sense, it becomes an empirical
claim that legal liberalism is incoherent by its own terms. 168 It fails
to deliver liberty, equality and rights and is not neutral or
apolitical.169
The substantiation of indeterminacy by immanent critique
draws upon many arguments and many philosophies-for example,
from those of Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Foucault-as well as from
phenomenology, structuralism and post-structuralism, even though
there is no necessary coherence among all of these sources. 170 A
162 SeeJefferson Powell, The Gospel According to Roberto: A Theological Polemic, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 1013, 1015-16;Jonathan Turley, The Hitchhiker's Guide to CLS, Unger and Deep Thought,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 593, 607 (1987); Hugh Collins, Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 14 J. L. & Soc'Y. 387, 402 (1987); Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 201, 225-27 (1984).
163 Tushnet, supra note 10, at 517.
164 Singer, supra note 85, at 20.
165 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 125 (1984).
166 See Gabel, supra note 154, at 46.
167 See DAVID HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS
183-89 (1980); Brosnan, supra note 146, at 333.
168 Singer, supra note 85, at 10.
169 Hunt, supra note 77, at 33.
170 For a list of different sources and meanings of indeterminacy, see Pierre Schlag,
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1683 (1991). See generally Brosnan, supra
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key assumption of CLS is that "our form of life" is groundless, in
which case any of its given assumptions or premises must be ques-
tioned but cannot be replaced. 171 In effect, what determines the as-
sumptions or premises about culture and its artifacts is simply
power, not necessarily conceived of as in anyone's hands but
deployed through systems of signification. 172 Just as this power has
no center or even locus, neither does the discourse about it, nor the
interpretation of it. For CLS, all of our uses of language have a
radical contingency, such that there are no core meanings, fixed
uses or definitions apart from the texts in which words exist and the
intentions of those who put them there, but meaning nonetheless
always escapes the speaker, the text and time.173 More generally, all
meanings are bound up with all others, including our sense of our-
selves and each other, because of the hermeneutic circle in which
meaning is based on assumptions, themselves dependent upon the
meaning of the first enquiry, and so on. 174
Obviously, however, the disconcerting reality for such extreme
critical insight is that, as much as arguments may be turned inside
out, hierarchies inverted and all webs of meaning reconfigured, the
world still goes on. So it seems that these local activities, whether
legal or not, only take place on the back of conventional practices or
within interpretive communities.1 75 The question, then, is whether
such a world is really interpreted all the way through, and if so, how
normativity becomes established, so that law can exist in the face of
the infinite deferral of meaning without involving the presence of
some objective reality or returning to the stability of conventional-
ism and established practices.1 76 This takes us beyond CLS and into
note 146; Boyle, supra note 78; Williams, supra note 158, at 482 (discussing the incom-
patibility of Derrida and Structuralism).
171 Stephen Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language, Struc-
turalism and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1231, 1240 (1985).
172 Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of An Essay on Power and Interpretation (with Suggestions on
How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 874 (1985).
173 J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743, 757, 759-60
(1987).
174 See Teresa Godwin Phelps &Jenny Ann Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of
Philosophical Hermeneuticsfor Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. Louis U. LJ. 353, 361 (1985).
175 This is where CLS meets other luminaries such as Dworkin and Fish. See J.M.
Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV.
393,408 (1987); Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 681-
91 (1986).
176 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 21-22 (1989). For an attack
on the way Rorty has been interpreted by CLS in general, see Singer, supra note 85, at 7-
70, and in particular, see John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332,
343 (1986). For the argument that there are normative consequences from interpreta-
tion deconstructively practiced, see generally Drucilla Cornell, Two Lectures on the Norma-
tive Dimensions of Community in the Law, 54 TENN. L. REV. 327 (1987).
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the post-modernism critique of the enlightenment project itself and
the reactions to the theoretical thrust of CLS, which may be summa-
rized as an attack upon the ideology of liberalism and the legal rea-
soning that articulates it.177 Basically, the CLS attack attempts to
deconstruct the privileges enjoyed by certain poles or hierarchies
within liberalism's antinomies or contradictions that operate at
every level and which, from the point of view of law, are unresolv-
able and ultimately incoherent. There are no reasons, other than
mere faith or superstition, for the priority of rules, objective knowl-
edge and human will in a system that accommodates conflicting in-
terests through the neutral application of rules to facts. 178 The
question that remains, however, is whether CLS has sufficient theo-
retical integrity rather than diversity to do more than reveal this crit-
icism.179 This is best considered by putting CLS' theoretical agenda
back into the context of the Academy's reactions to radicalism gen-
erally, so that the effects of movements such as CLS and Radical
Criminology may come to light.
III. DEBATE AND CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE ACADEMY
The challenges mounted by CLS and Radical Criminology, and
the counter challenges that were soon evident, provide an important
framework for understanding the future of "radical" challenges
within the Academy. Further, while these challenges were mostly
confined to the theoretical and ideological levels, they were not
without controversy at the institutional and social levels as well. Be-
cause many of the proponents of CLS and Radical Criminology sup-
ported leftist politics, political considerations became a dominating
influence in decisions regarding tenure and promotions at several
universities and law schools.
A. AGAINST RADICALISM: THE COUNTER REACTION TO RADICAL
CRIMINOLOGY
The challenges raised by Radical and Marxist Criminology have
had a profound and continuing impact. Throughout the past two
decades, debate has continued on the relevance and meaning of a
177 It may be said that CLS' critique of liberalism began with Unger. See UNGER, supra
note 160, at 29-190. For the view that CLS' liberalism is a "straw-man," see Williams,
supra note 158, at 485.
178 For these antinomies, see KELMAN, supra note 144, at 3. For an attack on the reli-
ance of self-evidence by modern jurisprudence, see Costas Douzinas & Ronnie Warring-
ton, On the Deconstruction of Jurisprudence: Fin(n)is Philosophiae, 14 J. LAw & Soc'y 33
(1987).
179 This is Hunt's basic criticism. See Alan Hunt, The Critique of Law: What is 'Critical'
About Critical Legal Theory?, 14J. LAw & Soc'y 5, 6, 18 (1987).
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radical approach to the study of crime and criminal justice. At times
acerbic and hostile, the response to Radical Criminology provides
an illuminating perspective for understanding what is likely to occur
when challenges are made to the established orthodoxy upon which
a discipline is founded. 180
Initially, much confusion resulted from the description of Radi-
cal Criminology by some proponents as "new," after the thesis of
Taylor, Walton and Young;' 8 ' and by others as "conflict," even
while conflict theorists like Vold and Turk saw their work not only as
non-Marxist, but non-partisan in content. 182 Turk's position is sup-
ported by Bernard, who writes that "[t]he primary purpose of con-
flict criminology is objective, nonpartisan analysis of the law
enactment and enforcement process."' 8 3
In challenging Bernard's thesis, radical criminologists argue
that an understanding of crime and the methods of control can only
come about by relating both the law enactment and enforcement
process to the economic structure. Thus, from the Marxist perspec-
tive of Radical Criminology, it is impossible to separate the capitalist
economy from the institution and agents of criminal justice and the
law. Because the capitalist economy is seen as exploitative, the de-
velopment of a radical theoretical perspective must by implication
carry with it radical politics. Properly understood, the Marxist no-
tion of praxis is inseparable from the notions of theory and sci-
ence-they are interdependent. 18 4
Compounding the early confusion, Sykes argued in his discus-
sion of Radical Criminology that the term itself "is misleading since
it suggests a particular ideological underpinning that probably does not
exist," and called instead for the use of the term "critical criminol-
ogy" without reference to the already established Frankfurt School
of Critical Theory. 18 5 While admitting that "Radical Criminology"
was related to the political and cultural changes of the 1960s, Sykes
doubted that it could be linked to any special political position. In
spite of all the evidence to the contrary, he argued that there was
180 See, e.g., Carl B. Klockars, The Contemporary Crisis of Marxist Criminology, 16 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 447, 478-80, 501-08 (1979); Jackson Toby, The New Criminology is the Old Senti-
mentality, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 516, 516-26 (1979).
181 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 57.
182 Austin T. Turk, Analyzing Official Deviance: For Nonpartisan Conflict Analyses in Crimi-
nology, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 459, 464-75 (1979); GEORGE VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
(1958).
183 Bernard, supra note 8, at 377.
184 See Elmer H. Johnson, Praxis and Radical Criminology, in RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY:
THE COMING CRISIS 161 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1980).
185 Sykes, supra note 57, at 208 (emphasis added).
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"no iron necessity that ties [radical criminologists] to either a liberal
or conservative stance."18 6
A more important challenge by Sykes came from his insistence
on calling Radical Criminology a "perspective" or "orientation"
rather than a theoretical approach involving a body of systematic
propositions.18 7 In raising this criticism, Sykes was challenging radi-
cal criminologists from the traditional positivist perspective that
they already had rejected. Such criticism, was of course not unex-
pected: disagreement and discourse regarding the intellectual and
empirical thrusts of any new school of thought are central compo-
nents of the Academy and usually welcomed by scholars in the fore-
front of new ideas or theories. What were unexpected, however,
were the institutional responses to radical criminologists, as well as
the heightened invective of some academic criminologists.
Evidence of this conflict is especially apparent in the reaction of
several criminologists to a special issue devoted to Radical Crimi-
nology by Criminology, the official journal of the American Society of
Criminology. Published with the intent of offering "a variety of per-
spectives on radical criminology," the contents provide only mini-
mal explication of the ideas of radical criminologists. 188 Of the six
leading articles, only the one by Richard Quinney can be considered
as falling within the paradigm of Radical Criminology. 189 By all ac-
counts, it was and remains an unbalanced issue that provided little
understanding of the ideas and views being developed by those
scholars who sought to establish a radical alternative to the domi-
nant paradigms of criminology.190
The controversy surrounding the special issue on Radical Crim-
inology resulted in heated debate at the annual meetings of the ASC
in 1979, and was not helped by the membership's rejection of a pro-
posal that the journal Criminology devote a second issue to the same
theme. While the new issue was not forthcoming, all of the articles
except Quinney's were included in a published work edited by the
same editor of the original controversial issue. Much more exten-
sive in content, the collection of articles provided a more-balanced
view of the nature of Radical Criminology in the United States and
186 Id. at 211 n.15.
187 Id. at 212.
188 See Special Issue, Radical Criminology, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1979).
189 Richard Quinney's article in the symposium, The Production of Criminology, 16 CRIMi-
NOLOGY 445 (1979), is in fact a revision of his article published a year earlier. See Quin-
ney, supra note 102.
190 Letter from James Garofalo et al. to the American Society of Criminology Presi-
dent and to the Editor of Criminology, in Tony Platt & Paul Takagi, The American Society of
Criminology: A Continuing Debate, 12 CRIME & SOC. JusT. 52, 53-4 (1979).
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included insightful commentary on both Radical Criminology and
its critics.19 '
In addition to the rejection of Marxist and Radical Criminology
on theoretical and ideological grounds, one of the major criticisms
directed at both perspectives revolves around the level of empirical
research generated by adherents of these positions. 192 Given that
radical criminologists rejected the positivist paradigm associated
with traditional criminology, it is not surprising that the counterat-
tack would focus on the level of empirical inquiry dominant among
Marxist and Radical Criminology. 93 In his 1975 Presidential Ad-
dress to the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Stanton
Wheeler raised this criticism by claiming that "whatever their value
in changing our conception of crime, they have not led to new and
fresh empirical inquiry."' 94
While Marxists have been generally hostile to positivism, they
have not necessarily viewed quantitative analysis as counterproduc-
tive.195 In meeting the objection of a neglect of empirical research,
a number of criminologists have sought to apply a radical approach
to the emergence of criminal activities,' 96 as well as to the existence
of disparity in judicial processing. 97 Whether these studies provide
the empirical evidence to support a Marxist and/or radical perspec-
tive is not the intention of this paper. Rather, it is to point out that a
major element of the counter challenge to Radical Criminology in-
volved a critical assessment of the conceptual framework along em-
pirical lines.
At the institutional level, controversy and conflict were also evi-
191 See RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: THE COMING CRISIS, supra note 10.
192 See Piers Beirne, Empiricism and the Critique of Marxism on Law and Crime, 26 Soc.
PROBS. 373, 373-74, 382-83 (1979) [hereinafter Empiricism]; David Jacobs, Marxism and
the Critique of Empiricism: A Comment on Beirne, 27 Soc. PROBS. 467, 467-69 (1980); Piers
Beirne, Some More on Empiricism in the Study of Law: A Reply toJacobs, 27 Soc. PROBS. 471
(1981).
193 See MichaelJ. Lynch, Quantitative Analysis and Marxist Criminology: Some Old Answers to
a Dilemma in Marxist Criminology, 29 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 110, 110-19 (1987); Schichor,
supra note 99, at 12-14.
194 Stanton Wheeler, Address to the Society for the Study of Social Problems (1975),
quoted in Empiricism, supra note 192, at 373.
195 See Lynch, supra note 193, at 110-112.
196 See, e.g., Judith Blau & Peter Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and
Violent Crime, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 114, 116-27 (1982); Mark Calvin &John Pauly, A Critique
of Criminology: Toward an Integrated Structural Marxist Theory of Delinquency Production, 89
AM. J. Soc. 513, 513-51 (1983); Allan J. Lizotte, Extra-Legal Factors in Chicago's Criminal
Courts: Testing the Conflict Model of Criminal Justice, 25 Soc. PROBS. 564, 564-580 (1978).
197 See, e.g., Lynch & Groves, supra note 10, at 86-89 for a review of these works. See
also Jeffrey H. Reiman & Sue Headlee, Marxism and Criminal Justice Policy, 27 CRIME &
DELINo. 24, 40-46 (1981); Christopher Adamson, Toward a Marxian Penology: Captive
Criminal Populations as Economic Threats and Resources, 31 Soc. PROBS. 435,437-454 (1984).
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dent in the response to "leftist" and Marxist criminologists. During
the 1970s, radical criminologists were not only denied tenure be-
cause of their political views, but also saw the dismantling of the
School of Criminology at Berkeley, largely because of its "leftist" or
radical orientation toward criminal justice.198 The closing of the
School of Criminology was seen by students at Berkeley as a major
assault on the process of radicalization that began at the University
in the late 1960s. 199 According to Platt, the School of Criminology
was intensely involved in political activity "generated by the broader
social conditions of revolt and resistance, and nourished by specific
experiences in Berkeley. ' 200 It was this political activity that led to
the closing of the School, which for Platt was "not an isolated exam-
ple of academic repression but rather part of systematic efforts by
the authorities to eliminate the gains of the student movement and
shift the current fiscal crisis onto the backs of working class and mi-
nority students." 20 1 Having seen the closing of Berkeley and the
production of an unbalanced analysis of Radical Criminology in the
special issue of Criminology, it is understandable that radical crimi-
nologists were concerned about what they called "a growing shift to
the right in professional criminology. ' 20 2 To what extent this shift
in criminology materialized is subject to discussion. There is, how-
ever, some irony in the fact that Ronald Reagan, who was Governor
of California during much of the crisis at Berkeley, was to become
President of the United States and establish a government largely
conservative in nature-a fact not lost on many criminologists con-
cerned with the role of law and justice in American society.
It is not that legitimate theoretical and methodological criti-
cisms associated with Radical/Marxist Criminology do not exist;
such criticisms are readily acknowledged by those most closely asso-
ciated with the attempts to incorporate Marxist theory into criminol-
ogy. 20 3 Rather, the challenge to criminology is to develop a body of
theory more powerful than that proposed by radical scholars-a the-
ory that can explain, without resorting to a Marxian analysis of capi-
talism, the relationships between the disruptions in the social and
cultural structures and the varieties of crime and injustices that exist
because of these disruptions. In this respect, Sykes was correct to
198 Editorial: Berkeley's School of Criminology, 1950-1976, 6 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 1 (1976)
[hereinafter Editorial]. Tony Platt is acknowledged as the predominant author.
199 Richard Schauffler & Michael Hannigan, Struggles for Justice, Criminology at Berkeley:
Resisting Academic Repression, 2 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 42, 43 (1974).
200 Editorial, supra note 198, at 2.
201 Id. at 3.
202 Platt & Takagi, supra note 190, at 53.
203 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 193, at I11.
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conclude that Radical Criminology "forces an inquiry into precisely
how the normative content of the criminal law is internalized in dif-
ferent segments of society, and how norm-holding is actually related
to behavior." 204
B. AGAINST INDETERMINACY: THE LEGAL ACADEMY RESPONDS TO CLS
A very similar pattern of reaction to CLS has produced similar
effects. The professional response to CLS was both intellectual and
institutional, while the social response was built up out of the pub-
licity surrounding various events at different institutions. Intellectu-
ally CLS was taken seriously. It introduced a new kind of
scholarship, novel resources and a passion hitherto lacking in legal
academia since perhaps the famous Hart-Fuller debate of the six-
ties. 20 5 The responses were, however, quite varied due to the diffi-
culty in pinning down a CLS agenda or program.20 6 They ranged
from dismissal because of a lack of scientific or empirical rigor, to
defensiveness because of the expropriation of philosophy for legal
purposes. 20 7 But in a very important way, all such intellectual re-
sponses were beside the point from CLS' claimed legitimate per-
spective. In attacking the mystifying effect of legal reason as a tool
of liberal politics it was also attacking legal theory and legal educa-
tion as a whole. Therefore, any internal intellectual critique would
be bound to reveal both the transcendent quality of the attack and
the self-referential quality of the defense. That people argued with
CLS was the victory it sought, even if intellectually they were con-
vinced that CLS was in error with reference to its position on liberal
politics.
While CLS scholars flooded the law reviews with articles, they
provoked little academic refutation or confirmation for a long time,
other than at conferences or symposia. Rather, the fundamental na-
ture of the CLS agenda became evident at the professional and insti-
tutional level, not the intellectual level. Indeed, it has been said
CLS should be seen as an episode in the history of legal educa-
204 Sykes, supra note 57, at 213.
205 Brosnan, supra note 146, at 262-63; LORD LLOYD, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TOJURIS-
PRUDENCE 716 (1985).
206 Anthony Chase, What Should a Law Teacher Believe?, 10 NOVA L. REV. 403, 409-14
(1986); ALTMAN, supra note 10, at 3.
207 As to "dismissal," see David M. Trubek &John Esser, 'Critical Empiricism' in Ameri-
can Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3, 9, 34
(1989); Schlegal, supra note 40, at 408; Trubek, supra note 10, at 585. As to "defensive-
ness," see Williams, supra note 158, at 391, on CLS' overuse of internal critique.
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tion.20 8 The site of the manufacture of mystification was said to be
the law school, not the office, courtroom, legislature or work place.
In short, the immediate aim of CLS was to politicize legal education,
empower students to undermine hierarchy and false consciousness
and subvert the role of law in upholding an unjust political sys-
tem.20 9 Behind much of CLS's substantive attacks on legal reason-
ing, case-law, doctrine, and judicial and political trends was an
attack on the pedagogy of legal education. Not only did CLS accept
the premise that law remained unexamined by modem critical the-
ory, despite being a cornerstone of the status quo, but it also
claimed that legal education's professionalization process was a
form of induction into the mysteries of the Rule of Law and an in-
doctrination into the ideology of liberal neutrality, doctrinal purity
and institutional integrity.
Not surprisingly, since CLS overtly preached the destabilization
of existing professional practices, it was considered a threat to the
vested interests of legal education. In particular, especially as re-
flection on the sources of critical theory began to crystalize, it was
characterized by some as nihilistic, from which certain implications
followed. 210 It was said to be self-contradictory to practice law or
teach future lawyers that law does not matter; if law does not ex-
press a public morality, then law is dead. 211 First aired publicly in a
symposium on professional responsibility and legal education, 212
this viewpoint inaugurated the most sustained and perhaps most
central confrontation about the role of the CLS.2 13 Interestingly
enough, the reaction of the legal academy to this symposium paral-
lels the earlier events surrounding the publication of the special is-
sue on Radical Criminology by the American Society of
Criminology. The key point of the debate was that, because of the
special value of law and the intimate connection between one's be-
208 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Studies as a Teaching Method, 35 LoY. L. REV. 383,
385 (1989).
209 Id. at 407. See also KENNEDY, supra note 50, at 33; Robert Coles, Hierarchy and Tran-
scendence, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1487 (1984) (reviewing DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983)).
210 Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984); see also
Singer, supra note 85, at 47-56; Daniel C.K. Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L. REV. 221,
258-98 (1990); Stick, supra note 176, at 395.
211 Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1986).
212 Symposium, Ethics in Academia: Power and Responsibility in Legal Education, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
213 For examples of this CLS viewpoint, see Symposium, "Of Law and the River," and of
Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Nihilism and Aca-
demic Freedom]; Symposium, Professing Law: A Colloquy on CLS, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1989) (Fiss' own re-
joinder to himself).
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liefs and a subject taught, a teacher of law could not doubt law's real
role in expressing social values and still teach law without driving
students away from the struggle for law to do justice. Such nihilists,
it was argued, should leave the Academy.21 4
The reactions to this challenge were revealing. Some scholars
disagreed, and asserted that members of the Academy are paid to
discover and teach what they find. 215 Others claimed that the real
nihilists are the burned-out liberals whose despair is concealed be-
hind the podium.2 16 Similarly, proponents of CLS replied that
those who deny the effects of power and ideology are the real nihil-
ists, because in fact student disenchantment comes from passively
portraying conventional practices as good, not from challenging
them. 217 Notably absent at the time were voices in agreement with
those who characterized CLS as nihilistic. If there was a community
of scholars, it rallied around the cause of academic freedom-a re-
sult which was no doubt gratifying to the CLS movement, since it
had hitherto experienced itself as peripheral and isolated. Never-
theless, although the Academy absorbed the defense of academic
freedom, the innuendo of subversiveness overshadowed the ideal-
ism of CLS for quite some time.21 8
In contrast to CLS' critique of legal education, the Academy le-
gitimized CLS' claim that it was the inheritor of a particular kind of
realistic agenda unfulfilled since 1945 by accepting the inconsisten-
cies and contradictions hard won by CLS as if they were obvious and
commonplace. For example, learning that law was a tool of class
interests or a vehicle of power was not likely to corrupt students. 219
In fact, CLS members were not cynics lacking in faith in the Rule of
Law but rather they were prophets assailing the worn-out dogmas of
an establishment. 220 Moreover, many traditional scholars accepted
the unmasking of the hypocrisy of neutral principles as the basis of
214 Ted Finman, Critical Legal Studies, Professionalism, and Acadmic Freedom: Exploring the
Tributaries of Carrington's River, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180, 183 (1985).
215 Letter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington, reprinted in Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, supra note 213, at 26 [hereinafter Fiss Letter].
216 Letter from Robert W. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington, reprinted in Nihilism and Aca-
demic Freedom, supra note 213, at 13 [hereinafter Gordon Letter].
217 Sanford Levinson, Professing Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis, 31 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 3, 13, 21 (1986); see also Gary Minda, The Politics of Professing Law, 31 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 61, 71 (1986).
218 Paul Bator has said that "CLS... had an absolutely disastrous effect on the intel-
lectual and institutional life of Harvard Law School." Michael Sturm, Bator to Take Chi-
cago Post, 81 HARV. L. RECORD 14 (1985).
219 Gordon Letter, supra note 216, at 3.
220 Id. at 9; see also Jay M. Feinman, Priests and Prophets, 31 ST. Louis U. LJ. 53, 59
(1986).
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constitutional adjudication. 22' In the end, even the idea of nihilism
and CLS' practice of trashing became subject to apologetic revision-
ism. 222 Thus, indeterminism did not mean that outcomes were the
result of whim or that law did not matter; rather, it meant only that
legal rules were open-ended. 223 One interpretation of the effect of
this conclusion was that the traditional constraints of legal and judi-
cial reason masked power and class, because equally logical argu-
ments could be derived from the same premises when applied to
facts to produce various outcomes. A major question was whether
there was something objective to which law could refer or whether
this belief masked hierarchy and exploitation. CLS affirmed the for-
mer by participating in its discourse, as well as affirming the latter by
trashing the former. Therefore, CLS advocates could rationally and
reasonably be seen and think of themselves as "ironic
conformists. ' 22 4
The defense of CLS against the attack of nihilism in terms of
professional authenticity, however, turned out to be a high price to
pay. It took the edge off CLS' rhetoric, focused CLS on legal educa-
tion, not social theory, and crystallized the forces of reaction. Mc-
Carthyism has lurked in the background to this ongoing debate. 225
The limits of academic freedom were debated; 226 the implications of
the suggestion that such nihilists ought to depart the Academy were
thrashed out.22 7 But this was only the front line of the battle. Be-
hind the scenes, the silence of support for the forces of reaction
became complicit in faculty politics. Professors left law schools be-
cause of hostile work environments, law schools became factional-
ized, and hiring and tenure appointments turned into rear-guard
221 See, e.g., John E. Dunsford, Nihilism and Legal Education-A Response to Sanford Levin-
son, 31 ST. Louis U. LJ. 27, 29 (1986) (explaining Dunsford's acceptance).
222 Trashing colloquially means ruining, destroying, randomly laying waste. This is
not what CLS actually meant, though at first CLS was quite happy to be thought of as
relentlessly running amok through "middle-of-the-road" legal culture, revealing contra-
dictions and exposing ambiguity. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293,
297, 321 (1984). Although Kelman had other things in mind when he wrote Trashing, as
is evident from his book, KELMAN, supra note 144, at 8, trashing is at one point in his
article associated with the critical analysis of legal argumentation as indeterminate. Kel-
man, supra, at 305. Unlike CLS, the concept of trashing has not been part of Radical
Criminology's lexicon. But see William Chambliss, On Trashing Marxist Criminology, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 231, 235 (1989).
223 For such a "soft" or "revisionistic" interpretation of indeterminacy in relation to
nihilism, see Finman, supra note 214, at 197-99.
224 Minda, supra note 217, at 68.
225 Gordon Letter, supra note 216, at 6; Letter from Paul Brest to Phillip Johnson,
reprinted in Nihilism and Academic Freedom, supra note 213, at 17.
226 Levinson, supra note 217, at 20; Finman, supra note 214, at 192.
227 See, e.g., Fiss Letter, supra note 215, at 16-23; Finman, supra note 214, at 184-87
(Finman's response).
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skirmishes. 228 While the fear of McCarthyism became a nightmare,
it was short-lived, at least in such a public form. By 1989, CLS was
declared to be "less threatening." 229 However, the cycle that began
with a flood of radically different scholarship in the late 1970s, cul-
minating in Unger's speech at Harvard in 1979, had been com-
pleted, arguably, with the Stanford Law Review issue of 1984-and
even then it was apparent to many that the future would belong to
feminism, postmodernism and race theory. 230
That CLS should have become party to something much larger
is not surprising because its origins lie also in something larger than
law, legal theory and legal education: namely, the cultural shifts
which became manifest during the 1960s. This is the key to under-
standing the external or social reaction to CLS. Its advocates were
seen as ideologues intent on destroying the legal tradition they re-
fused to carry forth, which made them suspect, if not irrelevant, to
issues-oriented activists working in the mine-fields of race relations,
environmentalism, consumer protection and even gender equal-
ity.23 1 In fact, CLS can be said to have played a part in raising con-
sciousness in the Academy about the possibilities of law's role in
social change. But the perception was that CLS either meant
revolution or was merely a fad.232 Of course, the seriousness of the
former denies the superficiality of the latter, but the public or social
reaction to CLS held these two contradictory perceptions simultane-
ously. Certainly, many CLS members were playing out forces first
tapped into in the sixties. They were part of the opening up of the
universities and its impact on law schools, and they were part of the
emergent awareness of dramatic social change that had taken place
after 1945.233 They were graduate radicals taking on the legal es-
tablishment and confronting the past with their present and their
vision of the future.
228 The details of this dimension to CLS' confrontation with mainstream legal culture
are yet to be gathered. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1530.
229 Fiss, supra note 213, at 250.
230 David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashingfrom Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical
Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 59, 81, 88, 90 (1985).
231 CLS, on the other hand, saw confrontation politics, not litigation or lobbying, as
the means to social change. See Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla War-
fare, 76 GEo. LJ. 1, 31 (1987). For a discussion of the conflict among radicals on the use
of the law instrumentally for social change, see Alan Hunt, The Radical Critique of Law: An
Assessment, 8 INT. J. Soc. L. 32 (1980).
232 This resulted from the confrontational style of politics called trashing and the
overabundance of European philosophers cited as authorities for premises and
background.




The misapprehension that CLS was a fad comes in part from
denying the importance of the sixties as a watershed in the interna-
tionalization of American culture and in part from mistaking theatri-
cal flair for a lack of substance. Further, the idea of the social
construction of reality signified not only that all is politics but that
all is art too. Hence, the blurring of lines between creativity and
intellect, role-playing and responsibility was exploited by CLS. But
the compromise in the 197 0s of the earlier vision of a Great Society
deepened the serious concern with the unravelling consensus about
America's future. Its style of activism hid a commitment to justice
driven by the critical insight that theory informs practice according
to the culture surrounding it.234
C. ROUTINIZATION OF RADICALISM WITHIN THE ACADEMY
It would seem that once revolutionary forces in the Academy
enter the public realm, as CLS did with its response to the nihilism
charge, they are transformed and spent as forces acting from within,
exactly to the extent that the Academy is insulated from society. De-
spite the commercialization of the university, the Academy within it
remains to some extent an ivory tower isolated from society at large.
Thus, the only people outside academia who cared about the trials
and tribulations of the appointment and tenure process at Berkeley
and Harvard were its alumnae and alumni. 235 Even when the Amer-
ican Bar Association investigated charges that four teachers at the
New England School of Law in Boston were denied tenure because
of their involvement in CLS, 23 6 nothing came of it, and it remained
a local incident. Although there were other such instances across
the country, these too remained parochial in scale, and did not
arouse the concern of the general public.237 To the degree that rad-
ical movements are unable to invoke external social and cultural
forces in their struggles, the debates are likely to be confined to the
234 Gordon, supra note 208, at 388.
235 In retrospect, this is certainly an accurate representation, although it belittles the
individuals involved. On the other hand, Leonard Minsky of the National Coalition for
Universities in the Public Interest alleged that by 1988 some 100 people had claimed
they were denied tenure for ideological reasons. Minsky was quoted as saying that
"Reagan has penetrated universities in much the same way that he tried to penetrate the
Supreme Court." Geoff Cowley & Sue Hutchinson, Down and Out in Cambridge, NEWS-
WEEK, Apr. 4, 1988, at 16.
236 Ethan Bronner, ABA to Probe Firing of 4 at N.E. Law School, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25,
1987, at 17, 38. An open letter was circulated to faculty in the Boston area dated May
11, 1987 with an enclosed copy of a letter from law faculty in the Boston area to the
Board of Trustees of the New England School of Law expressing concern at the alleged
threats to academic freedom and faculty autonomy. Id.
237 See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1519 nn.18-20.
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Academy, with much effort directed toward legitimation under the
principles of academic freedom. Such efforts are likely over time,
however, to result in the transformation of radical movements to a
stage in which radical ideas are incorporated into a traditional ca-
non, or worse, tolerated in some benign fashion.
The transformation of radicalism is evident for both CLS and
Radical Criminology, and indicates once again the importance of
viewing radicalism within the historical context of intellectual ideas
central to world views that are themselves continually evolving over
time. Thus, for example, in light of the previously discussed contro-
versy generated from the failure of the American Society of Crimi-
nology to publish a more balanced issue of "Radical Criminology"
in the early 1980s, concern began to be voiced about the role of the
Academy in the exclusion of ideas purely because they were threat-
ening to the status quo of American Criminology. 238
In the heat of battle, victors often exaggerate their successes.
This is true for intellectual warfare as well. Whether one agrees
with the point/counter-point arguments of the radical criminolo-
gists or their critics, the writings of both parties show a debate
largely polemical in content, undoubtedly stemming in part from
some of the more general and non-intellectual critiques and com-
ments on both sides. Perhaps this is why there appears to have been
a concerted effort to include criminologists identified as "radical" or
"Marxist" in orientation in the decision-making process of the
ASC. 23 9 This accommodation was further symbolized by the elec-
tion of William Chambliss to the Presidency of ASC in 1988. The
election of Chambliss, a respected scholar and.researcher long asso-
ciated with Radical Criminology, indicates to some extent the trans-
formation that Radical Criminology underwent within the discipline
of Criminology. From a traditional view of academic freedom, it
also draws attention to the need for a more inclusive approach to
dissenting opinions within the Academy. In this respect, it is not
difficult to expect that challenges made to traditional orthodoxy will
result in intellectual challenges and criticism; this should be the na-
ture of the Academy, even if it no longer resembles a community of
scholars. 240
Finally, despite the confusion and controversy associated with
238 See Frank R. Scarpetti, The Recent History of the American Society of Criminology, 10
CRIMINOLOGIST 1, 2 (1985).
239 Id.
240 See generally BRUCE WILSHIRE, THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF THE UNIVERSITY: PROFES-




Marxist and Radical Criminology, both perspectives continued to
develop throughout the past two decades. Criminology texts rou-
tinely include chapters by radical criminologists, whether writing
from a critical or Marxist perspective, while the annual meetings of
ASC generally include topical sessions that address crime and crimi-
nal justice from both perspectives. 24 1 The formal recognition of the
Division of Critical Criminology by the ASC in 1990 further
strengthens the legitimation of critical/radical criminology within
the discipline. Whether this legitimation will influence scholars of
crime and criminal justice to give more consideration to non-con-
ventional crimes like terrorism, state criminality and international
espionage is difficult to determine.242 What is evident, however, is
that the early call by the Schwendingers for criminology to give
greater emphasis to "human rights" violations now seems hardly
controversial in light of the events of the last decade. 243
The process of routinization is also evident with CLS, although
not nearly to the extent that seems to have taken place with Radical
Criminology. In countering the charge of nihilism, CLS was trans-
formed by its efforts to legitimate itself within the Legal Academy
from a conference or movement to a valid theory. But as such its
identity came at a price. At the same time CLS was legitimating its
ideas and views of the law and legal theory, universities were becom-
ing more embroiled in the larger issues of race, feminism and multi-
culturalism. This transformation, now so evident in American edu-
cation, is in part the result of the growing priority in American soci-
ety in recognizing the claims of inclusion and diversity, whereas CLS
had been concerned with the injustices derivative from class, hierar-
chy and power. This shift in priorities forced CLS to narrow its fo-
cus to legal education and legal reasoning and to acquiesce in an
identity appropriate to resisting the charges of nihilism continually
directed to CLS, even though CLS had always self-consciously
lacked an identity. The belief in the diversity of race, gender and
culture, allegedly now so extreme a standard to some that its cor-
rectness has to be defended at the price even of truth or certainly
the integrity of the western tradition, is consistent with the reaction
of CLS to a unified and predominantly white, male legal profession
and it reflects the generation of autonomous groups from CLS, each
241 For an overview of topics dealing with critical perspectives in crime and criminal
justice, see the American Society of Criminology Program listings for 1991, 1992 and
1993. See also NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY (Brian D. MacLean & Dragan
Milovanovic eds., 1991).
242 Gregg Barak, Resisting State Criminality and the Struggle for Justice, in CRIMES BY THE
CAPITALIST STATE 273, 273-81 (Gregg Barak ed., 1991).
243 Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 46, at 145.
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with its own separate agendas. That the call for diversity has pro-
duced such a backlash as to be labeled "political correctness" shows
both the fragmentation of CLS and the importance of its attack on
traditional legal theory. While it can be said that CLS has become
routinized or domesticated, and that it has failed to affect legal edu-
cation, CLS can also be said to have legitimized itself with an agenda
taken up by others both within and beyond the confines of the legal
academy.
The "domestication" of CLS is of course part of its legitima-
tion.2 44 Not only has it established an alternative paradigm for
thinking about law, there are now token representatives on faculties,
and there are likely to be representatives of CLS on panels and at
conferences.2 45 CLS is now discussed in modem legal theory texts
and courses around the country. Most agree that it has widened the
conversation about law with radical theories of the legal subject, in-
terpretation, rights, and the intellectual history of areas of doc-
trine.2 46 However, more important has been the fragmentation of
its theoretical agenda along the fault-lines of its challenges.
Part of this concerns the problematic relationship between CLS
and substantive law, especially the criminal law; another part con-
cers the relationship between CLS and the sociology of law.2 47
Some have argued that CLS' positive agenda ought to have been
empirical studies.2 48 On the other hand, the lack of rapprochement
between CLS and empiricism reflects an uncertainty about method;
namely, whether scholarship can be both critical and empirical.2 49
For some, critical empiricism simply means either a description of
law that is self-conscious of its values and assumptions, or it means
selecting an agenda to be then described but doing so critically ac-
cording to its under-representedness or its exclusion.2 50 To CLS
this remains unsatisfactory because it is ambiguous towards the rela-
tionship of knowledge and politics and thus uncommitted to
change.2 51 This key theme in CLS, that praxis necessitates under-
standing one's own complicity in the production and reproduction
244 White, supra note 136, at 840.
245 Gordon, supra note 208, at 393.
246 Id. at 393-94; Levinson, supra note 217, at 25; Fiss, supra note 213, at 250.
247 Quite simply, it appears that CLS has devoted an article or two to each substantive
area of law with the exception of constitutional law. KELMAN, supra note 144, at 325,
338, 340.
248 John Conley & William O'Barr, Fundamentals ofJurisprudence: An Ethnography ofJudi-
cial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REv. 467, 469-70 (1988).
249 This has been the subject of a recent symposium entitled Critical Empiricism and
Sociolegal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQOiRY 3 (1989).
250 William Whitford, Critical Empiricism, 14 LAW & Soc. INQuiRY 61, 65 (1989).
251 See Trubek & Esser, supra note 207, at 32.
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of legal consciousness, has enabled CLS to distinguish itself from
other social sciences. It has not, however, guaranteed an internal
coherence to CLS.
There have always been divisions in CLS-between Unger and
the rest, between the Marxists and Frankfurt scholars and between
phenomenologists and non-phenomenologists. 252 CLS' unclear
identity, evidenced by the all-inclusive bibliographies and the exclu-
sive cell of masters, reflected its lack of dogma, if not a central theo-
retical basis. 253 The fragmentation into separate schools of critical
race theorists and feminists revealed not only that the negative
thrust of CLS lacks a positive agenda and may even be dominated by
white males, but also that it has resulted in a vacuum.2 54 Further,
the negative effect of semiotics and deconstruction has led only to
an endless process of the demystification of language, which repro-
duces an orthodoxy of legal education narcissistically focused on it-
self as the text. 255 As a result, the identification of praxis with
repression in the social world was relinquished to feminists and race
theorists. This is especially significant when CLS' relationship to
Radical and Critical Criminology is considered, for CLS has hardly
focused on criminal law as a prime locus of the deployment of class
and power by way of liberal values. 256 The reasons for this are com-
plex, not the least of which is that CLS draws upon philosophy
rather than social sciences for its inspiration, unlike criminology and
criminal law.257 Nevertheless, despite the apparent emasculation of
CLS' positive agenda by feminism and critical race theory, CLS re-
mains productive in the analysis of the substantive content of doc-
trine in terms of recent intellectual history.258 CLS' historical
revisionism may turn out to be its most enduring contribution.
To conclude, therefore, CLS was radical not reflexive; it
brought something new to law, legal theory and legal education. It
was avant-garde; as such, its role was defined.259 Even as an end in
itself, CLS could not become identified with the given and still sur-
vive.260 Its domestication was the result of its self-identification with
the legitimacy of the law profession; its fragmentation followed as its
252 See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
253 See Hunt, supra note 23, at 34.
254 See Fiss, supra note 213, 251-55.
255 Anthony Chase, Who Needs Information when You're Working Underground? Legal Edu-
cation, Social Context and the Public Interest, 12 NOVA L. REv. 55, 67-69 (1987).
256 David Nelken, Critical Criminal Law, 14J. L. & Soc'y 105, 107 (1987).
257 Id. at 111.
258 Gordon, supra note 208, at 393. Gordon's real assertion about the value of CLS
concerns its effectiveness in the classroom. Id. at 407.
259 David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1656, 1657 (1986).
260 Brosnan, supra note 146, at 396.
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impact waned. In essence, CLS has been transformed but not tran-
scended or transmuted.26 1 Gone are the mythologies of Unger's
post-modem Christian-liberal vision of political rejuvenation and
the inversion of hierarchies by context-smashing. Gone also from
public view are the rituals of crisis-provocation, counter-culture
publications, footnotes of networked contacts, summer camps, and
planning cells. What remains is CLS' utopian challenge that we can
remake our social world despite the fact that law appears to be
given, real, and unyielding. CLS has revitalized secular idealism in
the wake of the loss of the religious foundations of western law, and
it has resisted the alternative deification of the positive law. 262 This
is no small achievement. Further, because it also rests upon faith in
the possibility of transforming false consciousness through self-un-
derstanding, CLS has importantly linked law and legal theory to our
therapeutic culture.26 3 Hence, part of the alternative paradigm be-
queathed by CLS consists of the inseparability of praxis from theory
and application, as well as from process and content. Another part
of the paradigm consists of CLS' ongoing demand for uncovering of
exploitation and alienation as a side-effect of the struggle between
enlightenment and false consciousness. Although feminism and
race theory may have taken CLS' positive content away from it, its
agenda of confrontation remains, as does the need for doctrinal
analysis, structural surveys and immanent critique. It is as hard to
imagine that CLS will cease to exist as it is to imagine that such
strategies are passe. However, the fact remains that CLS, Unger
notwithstanding, lacked a social theory that would allow it to make
the transition from its critique of law to an understanding of the
culture shifts dominating Western society. An analysis of the inter-
nal dynamics of these shifts is essential, we believe, to understand-
ing the future of radicalism within the Academy.
IV. RADICALISM AND THE ACADEMY IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC
CULTURE
In the present analysis, our goal has been to examine the pat-
261 A conference entitled Policy in the Nineties:'A Crit Network Conference, was held at
Harvard Law School and Northeastern Law School on April 10-12, 1992. CLS' Novem-
ber 1991 newsletter was dedicated to the memory of MaryJoe Frug, who was murdered
in April 1991. A posthumously published work by Frug was parodied by some members
of the Harvard Law Review. The resulting debacle, which involved political correctness,
trashing, feminism, and freedom of speech, drew out all the CLS positions anew.
Anthony Flint, Harvard Law Society Split in Parody's Wake, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1992,
at 1.
262 Dunsford, supra note 221, at 34.
263 Feinman, supra note 220, at 60; RIEFF, supra note 128, at 232.
1993] 545
CARDARELLI & HICKS
terns of radical challenge in law and criminology that have been
dominant in the Academy during the past three decades. We be-
lieve our analysis of the patterns of emergence, the targets of chal-
lenge, the theoretic thrust, and the counter challenges provides a
sociology of knowledge analysis of the convergent patterns of radi-
calism possible within the historical context of the Academy. Radi-
cal Criminology and CLS were both reactions to the idealism of the
old Left and its faith in communism and socialism, and to the com-
promise of modern liberalism between social welfare and individual
liberty. Both movements challenged the scientific belief in value-
free and neutral methods of law, policy and social theory for grasp-
ing the truth about ordinary reality. Both played an important part
in unveiling hidden truths about the complexity and contingency of
the social world at the end of the twentieth century, and by shatter-
ing illusions and complacency they provoked bitter reactions. More
importantly, not only were they both in part responsible for making
their respective professions rethink some fundamental assumptions,
but in retrospect it appears that both movements were parts of some
larger cultural shift in which are discernible the limits to their effi-
cacy and perhaps the demise of radical academic movements as we
know them now altogether.
Very briefly, the real insight of critical theory, upon which both
Radical Criminology and CLS drew, was the constitutive nature of
consciousness: its distortion as false consciousness and its surplus
repression by capitalism. 264 The full understanding of this was opti-
mistically elevated to an alchemical key for the transformation of
modern, post-industrial society. Insofar as both radical movements
were driven by such a revolutionary goal, they became overtaken by
a post-modern attitude (which for the moment must be left unde-
fined) that unmasks such ideals. Closely connected to this is the fact
that today our society achieves the common good, in all its varieties,
through the political process. This process largely occurs beyond
the influence of the academic community, which is now relegated to
the role of commentator. The sociology of knowledge must now
address the question of whether it is possible to effect radical
change within society from an academic setting in a culture charac-
terized by a primarily therapeutic nature, and a politics that is in-
creasingly exclusive.
264 RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL 58 (1981); HELD, supra note 165, at 317.
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A. THE ACADEMY IN PERIL?
There is much agreement today that the dramatic changes that
have taken place in universities during the last thirty years have re-
sulted in a state of crisis for academia that appears to be beyond the
ability of universities to establish appropriate solutions. 265 In the
early 1960s, the New Left not only challenged the liberalism of the
Academy; it also mounted a serious and compelling challenge to the
collusion of the universities with government, especially to academic
research that supported the military-industrial complex. Universi-
ties were attacked both for their lack of relevance to an increasingly
complex, moral and informational society, and for promoting a
trend toward the multi-university, with its emphasis on academics as
entrepreneurs. 266 A close analysis of these challenges provides evi-
dence that the dominant public ideology of society plays a signifi-
cant role in the manifestation and extent of radicalism within the
university. The anti-communist ideology of the 1940s and 1950s re-
strained and stifled radical dissent in the Academy. In contrast, the
upheaval of the 1960s supported and sustained radical dissent in the
Academy and provided radical scholars the opportunity to raise to
the public the issue of "what was wrong with America."
This attack was the first thrust of the democratization or open-
ing up of academic opportunity. Today, that process has led to
greater vocational relevance in curricula, more conservatism be-
cause students are consumers who can leave, and the separation of
the responsibility to be independent and critical from the responsi-
bility of teaching. Further, the decline of praxis caused by the rou-
tinization of radicalism in the Academy raises the issue of whether
institutional norms can be transformed solely through critical
analysis.
Today, universities, like everything else, are responding to the
pressures of a free market by competing in a market place within a
larger market directed to the consumption of ideas. They are in-
creasingly governed by the laws of supply and demand in their
courses, services, and a declining student population. Often, their
direction is determined by having to compete for resources with
general social and economic needs. Their own agendas are set by
predictions of largesse and corporate support. In effect, university
265 Mark Tushnet, Political Correctness, the Law and the Legal Academy, 4 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 127, 162-63 (1992).
266 KATz, supra note 240, at 173; Sol Stem, A Deeper Disenchantment, in THE AGE OF
PROTEST 55, 55-66 (Walt Anderson ed., 1969). See generally KENNETH KENISTON, YOUNG
RADICALS (1968); GITLIN, supra note 17; RICHARD FLAcKs, YOUTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(1971).
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education is driven by whatever has economic power or governmen-
tal backing to become a service industry of the culture at large.
More than 3000 colleges and universities in the United States are
not only competing for a declining student population, but they are
competing among themselves for the claim that they are centers of
intellectual activity and research. One outcome of this activity is the
continued proliferation of academic journals and articles so over-
whelming in numbers that one is forced to define one's academic
interests more narrowly than at any time in the past. In response to
these changes, faculty pull away from the classroom and have closer
ties to professional associations than to colleagues. One result of
this transition is the decline of internal criticism once seen as vital to
the role of the university. Further, because of the increased speciali-
zation and pluralism of disciplines, faculty must compete more,
which mutes external criticism because of the burden of being an
expert across boundaries. Finally, important public reflection is no
longer produced at universities as such, but rather in separate gov-
ernmental institutions, corporate research foundations, think-tanks,
centers of policy, and so on. It is increasingly hard, therefore, to
justify the role of social critic within an academic setting when that
setting is neutral in the sense of answering to anyone, but not value-
free in the sense of resisting those with power. The legitimacy of
critics within academia, like CLS and Radical Criminology, is under-
mined by the changed roles of universities within culture as a whole.
This is an important premise; but to understand the future role of
radicalism within the Academy, more than the changing nature of
the university environment must be considered. Scholars and critics
must also examine the outlines of the cultural shifts that continue to
influence the acceptance and rejection of radical ideas and beliefs
within the culture at large. Since no culture is immutable, the po-
tential success of any radical movement may depend more on its
ability to address the controlling beliefs within any culture than on
the strategies and ideologies underlying the emergent radicalism.
The importance of addressing the internal dynamics of culture is
evident in the works of Robert Bellah,267 Christopher Lasch,268 and
especially Philip Rieff.269
267 See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COM-
MITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) [hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART]; ROBERT BELLAH
ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991).
268 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN
AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1979).
269 See, e.g., RIEFF, supra note 128; PHILIP RIEFF, FELLOW TEACHERS (1972) [hereinafter
FELLOW TEACHERS]; PHILIP RIEFF, THE FEELING INTELLECT: SELECTED WRITINGS
(Jonathan B. Imber ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE FEELING INTELLECT].
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B. RADICALISM WITHIN A THERAPEUTIC CULTURE
In an early and important analysis of change in Western cul-
ture, Philip Rieff argued that there was no longer a unitary system of
belief but rather that there are "several systems of belief competing
for primacy in the task of organizing personality in the West. '270
Among these belief systems is the "therapeutic" culture, which is
seen by Rieff as revolutionary in the cultural sense, in contrast to
revolutionary in the political sense, which is the usual focus when
one talks of such movements. 271 To understand this shift, it is best
to quote Rieff himself:
The therapeutics must be understood precisely in their efforts to go
beyond the analytic attitude.... None of their doctrines promises an
authentic therapy of commitment to communal purpose; rather in
each the commitment is to the therapeutic effort itself ... The ther-
apy of all therapies is not to attach oneself exclusively to any particular
therapy, so that no illusion may survive of some end beyond an in-
tensely private sense of well-being to be generated in the living of life
itself.2 7 2
As the successor to early cultural belief systems organized
around the sacred and its prohibitions, for Rieff the therapeutic cul-
ture is "the most revolutionary of all modern movements-toward a
new world of nothing sacred. ' 273 The therapeutic "needs no crite-
rion for conduct because he is willing and able to use all criteria." 274
Thus, he is a character type who "revalues his values whenever he
grows displeased with them." 275
Because the therapeutic revolution is being conducted from the
top down, not from the bottom up, its members are largely drawn
from the leisured, affluent and intelligent classes. Whether they are
from the left or right, the abdication of their historic function to
assert the authority of communal purpose signifies a major shift in
Western culture, one that may be irreparable. 276 The significance of
the therapeutic revolution is underscored when contrasted with the
decline of Marxism, which for Rieff was the "last great institutional
example in Western history of a creedal elite... which would prac-
270 RIEFF, supra note 128, at 2. See generally DANIEL SCHANAHAN, TOWARD A GENE-
OLOGY OF INDIVIDUALISM (1992) and RALPH KETcHAM, INDIVIDUALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE:
A MODERN DILEMMA (1987) for a discussion of the evolution of individualism and some
alternatives to the individualistic paradigm.
271 RIEFF, supra note 128, at 260.
272 Id. at 261.
273 THE FEELING INTELLECT, supra note 269, at 354.
274 Id. at 356.
275 Id. at 363.
276 RIEFF, supra note 128, at 9.
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tice what it preached and intended not to preach everything. '277 As
a doctrinal movement espousing a common purpose, Marxism can
be viewed as "culturally conservative," in contrast to that of the
therapeutic system, with its "anti-creedal" philosophy, in which
therapy is the modal experience of culture 2 78 It is this parallel
movement-the decline of Marxism as a creedal movement, and the
triumph of the therapeutic, a largely anti-creedal philosophy-that
has major implications for understanding the future of radicalism, in
both the Academy and society at large.
Having despaired of the sacred interdicts of religion, the cor-
ruption of Marxism by Stalin and his later disciples, and the failure
of leftists to solidify the theory-praxis connection, many former radi-
cals and their less active but sympathetic cohorts have become ma-
jor consumers, if not the dispensers, of the therapeutic culture. 279
The proliferation of the therapeutic culture is readily seen in the
transformation of a significant part of professional activity into
counseling, as is evident by the vast network of therapeutic enter-
prises in the urban centers of our country, in the never ending "self-
help" publications advocating some type of twelve-step program to
a healthy self, and in the continued effort to view criminal behavior
as "sick" and/or "ill," in contrast to the early creedal sanctions of
such behavior as immoral or sinful.280 Even many of our religious
elites are now more occupied in administering to the psychological
needs of their parishioners rather than the traditional spiritual crises
associated with sin and immorality. Whether the recent clamor by
those on the right for a renewal of the old interdicts will have any
success is difficult to foretell. 28' But, because the radical right is
espousing a creedal movement that is at odds with the private lives
of so many, the clarion call is likely to be resisted. Being "saved"
for many Americans bears little resemblance to the moral code of
the early and late Christians. To emphasize a community of author-
ity in a decidedly therapeutic age is likely to be resisted; worse still,
it might be seen as devoid of meaning and thereby doomed to fail-
ure. In the final analysis, radicals both in the university and its envi-
277 FELLOW TEACHERS, supra note 269, at 126.
278 THE FEELING INTELLECT, supra note 269, at 356.
279 See HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 267, at 97, for examples of how therapy is
utilized in life experiences. See also ROBERT CASTEL ET AL., THE PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY
265-85 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1982).
280 It is difficult to substantiate such a subjective perception, but the authors draw the
reader's attention to the recent emergence of "self-help" sections in book stores and
libraries.
281 See HUNTER, supra note 15, at 43, for a discussion of the conflict between progres-
sive and orthodox groups within the religious bodies of America.
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rons, whether of the left or right, may find it necessary to couch
their revolutionary messages in therapeutic language if they are to
be heard with any conviction. The turn to literature in every disci-
pline may be indicative of just such an awareness that simply read-
ing or engaging in narrative has begun to overcome the need to
learn and the right to teach well.
C. A CONCLUDING STATEMENT
It is not that universities are no longer engines of change. They
never were. In fact, part of the failure of the New Left to maintain
its dynamic is that, for the most part, radicalism became centered in
the universities to the exclusion of trade unions, city neighbor-
hoods, and newspapers. 28 2 The early and important emphasis on
theory and praxis appears to have been tenuous at best, as most of
those in the New Left have either abandoned or been excluded from
the public arena. 28 3 Whether the New Right's success in the 1980s
is responsible for the Left's ideological failures is open to debate;
what is evident, however, is that "[t]he ineffectiveness of the left
supports the ascendancy of the right." 284
The role of the Left in the Academy over the last three decades
is acutely described by Diggins, a long-time observer of the Left in
American society. In his most recent work, he comments on the en-
durance and perseverance of the Left in the United States:
What is striking about the Academic Left is its persistence despite his-
torical developments and political realities. The intellectual staying
power of the Left in the United States is matched by that in only one
other European country, England, where Marxism retains some hold
on the academic mind. Curiously, where Communist parties have tra-
ditionally been strong, as in France and Italy, Marxism fell on hard
times in the eighties, but where Communism as a political force has
been weak, as in England and the United States, Marxism as an ideol-
ogy survives with some strength in the cloistered world of the acad-
emy. Perhaps this disparity only highlights the insights of Max Weber
about the demise of movements and the inevitability of institutions.
As an intellectual movement promoting itself in protests and publica-
tions, the Left had to compete on the open market; as an academic
phenomenon presiding over a university, the tenured Left has less
need to compete to survive, and it now has an ally in bureaucracy and
its drive to expand. If Wall Street depends upon capital accumulation,
the Academic Left depends upon cohort accumulation.285
Universities can still be a source of forces that provide an impe-
282 JACOBY, supra note 22, at 190.
283 For an alternative view, see ATrEWELL, supra note 33, at 268.
284 GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 103.
285 DIGGINS, supra note 1, at 294; see also FLAcKs, supra note 23, at 237.
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tus for change, but these forces must be pluralistic and liberal, not
committed to any exclusive set of values. 28 6 In the past, to the de-
gree universities were one-dimensional profiles of vested govern-
mental and economic interests, they were met with similarly single-
minded radicalism. Moreover, the more this phenomena prevailed,
the more most academics remained committed to making the system
work, being neither guardians of the independence of mind nor rad-
ical critics of that absence. In today's culture, however, there is a
growing concern that the intellectual as critic or radical has been co-
opted by the academic in the new culture of the university serving
the Establishment.
Today, the role of the academic in society is largely informative
rather than transformative. 28 7 Intellectuals are no longer able to ar-
ticulate the boundaries of culture or its common purposes so as to
generate a sense of social belonging. Because our culture, as a
whole, espouses an ideology of individualism that is largely thera-
peutic, there is no need for specialists to perform what is now so
largely a private enterprise. The intellectual's creativity in redeem-
ing lost causes and providing new symbols for their replacement has
passed to other social actors. As a result, the role of the radical or
the intellectual in the Academy has become redundant. Academics
are merely the medium of the maintenance of the status quo
through the important role that universities now have in the institu-
tionalization of politics. Post-modernism recognizes this and passes
it by. Law and politics are now situated in the landscape of culture.
Radical movements in the Academy, henceforth, will have to begin
not with false consciousness or class exploitation but with the
changing configuration of moral demands that provide meaning to
the everyday events of people's lives.
In summary, our historical analysis suggests that the limited
success of radical movements within the United States during the
last thirty years can be attributed, in part, to overlooking the impor-
tance of culture to revolutionary change. Because the present cul-
ture has become so thoroughly therapeutic, it has become much
more difficult to define and articulate what is in the public's inter-
est.28 8 In the future, if radical movements are to be successful in
establishing social change, they must not only be able to understand
286 See GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 118-31, for a discussion of the threat of ideology
and cynicism to American education. See also THOMAS BENDER, INTELLECT AND PUBLIC
LIFE: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ACADEMIC INTELLECTUALS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1993).
287 RIEFF, supra note 128, at 73. See also Bender, supra note 286, at 141.
288 ANDREWJ. POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE THERAPEUTIC STATE (1991). See also MIMI
WHITE, TELE-ADVISING: THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE IN AMERICAN TELEVISION (1992) for
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the cultural shifts that are taking place, but more importantly, must
also be able to draw upon the internal dynamics of the culture to
raise to observation the desired need for social and political
change. 28 9 Given the historical resistance of radicalism to the indi-
vidualization of consciousness and its practical consequences, such
as a foreshortening of visionary ends, this appears unlikely.
In the final analysis, the continuing centralization of power in
university administrations, the specialization and fragmentation of
academic disciplines, and the demands associated with academic
tenure and promotion make it increasingly difficult for members of
today's Academy to engage in a radical politics outside the univer-
sity. Whether the Academy, in a decidedly individualistic culture,
can reignite the dormant idealism of American society is difficult to
determine.290 For the present historical moment at least, radicalism
may be a luxury few academics can afford to pursue.
an analysis of the impact of therapeutic discourse on family construction and consumer
culture. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 30 (1981).
289 Dick FIacks, Making History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Rele-
vance, in INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS: SOCIAL THEORY IN A CHANGING WORLD 3, 13-18
(Charles C. Lemert ed., 1991); BREINES, supra note 1, at 151.
290 The reduced potential for radical politics need not preclude the much needed role
of academics to bring a rich theoretical perspective to public life. Bellah in his work
argues that we need to reconstruct a public philosophy tied to an elaboration of the
conditions necessary for a full democracy, and that social scientists must be part of this
effort. HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 267, at 297-307. See also BENDER, supra note
286, at 145.
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